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ABSTRACT 
The use of equity derivatives to conceal economic ownership of shares (“hidden 
ownership”) is increasingly drawing attention from the financial community, as is the 
exercise of voting power without corresponding economic interest (“empty voting”). 
Market participants and commentators have called for expansion of ownership disclosure 
rules, and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are now contemplating how to 
respond. Yet, in order to design appropriate responses it is key to understand why we have 
ownership disclosure rules in the first place. This understanding currently appears to be 
lacking, which may explain why we observe divergent approaches between countries. The 
case for mandatory ownership disclosure has also received remarkably little attention in the 
literature, which has focused almost exclusively on mandatory issuer disclosure. Perhaps this 
is because most people assume that ownership disclosure is a good thing. But why is such 
information important, and to whom? This paper aims to answer these fundamental 
questions, using the European disclosure regime as an example. First, the paper identifies 
two main objectives of ownership disclosure: improving market efficiency and corporate 
governance. Next, the paper explores the various mechanisms through which ownership 
disclosure performs these tasks. This sets the stage for an analysis of hidden ownership and 
empty voting that demonstrates why these phenomena are so problematic. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A “huge question for regulators and arguably an embarrassment for all European capital 
markets,” is how one analyst responded to the news that carmaker Porsche used equity 
derivatives to silently build up a large stake in Volkswagen in the fall of 2008.1 The use of 
equity derivatives to conceal economic ownership of shares (“hidden ownership”) is a 
phenomenon that is increasingly drawing attention from the financial community, as is the 
exercise of voting power without corresponding economic interest (“empty voting”).2 
Market participants and commentators have called for expansion of ownership disclosure 
rules, and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are now contemplating how to 
respond. 
Yet, in order to design appropriate responses it is key to understand why we have 
ownership disclosure rules in the first place. This understanding currently appears to be 
lacking, which may explain why we observe divergent approaches between countries.3 The 
case for mandatory ownership disclosure has also received remarkably little attention in the 
academic literature, which has focused almost exclusively on mandatory issuer disclosure.4 
Perhaps this is because most people assume that ownership disclosure is a good thing.5 But 
why is such information important, and to whom?  
This paper aims to answer these fundamental questions, using the European ownership 
disclosure regime as an example. A focus on the European regime is useful because this 
regime has been developed fairly recently and a number of justifications have been offered 
                                                
1 Richard Milne, Hedge Funds Hit As Porsche Moves On VW, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008. For a 
discussion of this case, see infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
2 The terminology has been introduced by Henry T. Hu & Bernard S. Black, The New Vote Buying: 
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811, 815, 816 (2006). 
3 See EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS EXPERT GROUP (ESME), FIRST REPORT OF ESME ON THE 
TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE 2 (2007) (suggesting that one of the reasons for the divergent approaches in 
different European countries appears to be the lack of a clear recognized reason for the imposition of the 
European disclosure regime). See also NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 195 (Oxford 
University Press 2008) (noting that the European disclosure regime suffers from a lack of clarity as to its core 
objectives). 
4 For a comprehensive overview of this debate, see Merritt B. Fox, Artyom Durnev, Randall Morck & 
Bernard Y. Yeung, Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 Mich. L. 
Rev. 331, 335-344 (2003). 
5 Cf. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 51 (2004) (referring to ownership disclosure as “one of the basic rights” of 
investors). 
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for it. It is also appropriate in light of the fact that the British Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), which operates within the European framework, has taken the 
international lead when it comes to adjusting ownership disclosure rules to changed market 
circumstances. However, the basic insights yielded by the paper can be applied universally 
and should be of interest to scholars and policymakers around the globe, including the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The paper is structured as follows. Part I identifies two main objectives of ownership 
disclosure rules: improving market efficiency and corporate governance. Next, it explores 
the different mechanisms through which ownership disclosure performs these tasks. This 
sets the stage for a systematic analysis of hidden ownership and empty voting.  
Part II describes some recent high-profile cases that have occurred in Europe and in the 
US and that illustrate the dramatic effects of hidden ownership. Next, it analyzes the extent 
to which this phenomenon is captured by existing rules under the disclosure regime. The 
analysis suggests it is not, at least not effectively. Finally, this Part demonstrates how 
hidden ownership undermines the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure improves 
market efficiency and corporate governance. Part III offers a similar analysis of empty 
voting. Together, Parts II and III enable a better understanding of why hidden ownership 
and empty voting are so problematic. 
Part IV describes some important policy implications. In general, policymakers 
contemplating how to respond to hidden ownership and empty voting should not focus only 
on the most obvious problems caused by these phenomena, such as malfunctioning of the 
market for corporate control. Instead, they should take into account the whole range of 
adverse effects described in this paper. Specifically, the European Commission, which is 
currently evaluating the European ownership disclosure regime, should consider expanding 
the scope of the disclosure rules. In each case, policymakers should duly take into account 
the potential costs of increased disclosure, which are highlighted in this paper.  
The paper concludes by summarizing the main findings and by pointing at certain 
related issues that merit careful consideration, such as the issue of regulatory competition. 
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I. THE OBJECTIVES OF MANDATORY OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE 
An obligation to disclose major shareholdings was introduced at European level in 1988 
with the “Large Holdings Directive”.6 This directive significantly improved transparency 
levels and enabled large-scale studies of control patterns in Europe.7 However, its limited 
scope and application led observers to conclude that it was not generating the data it was 
supposed to.8 In 1999, the European Commission announced a range of measures to 
promote integration of European financial markets. One of the aims was to enable issuers 
to raise capital on competitive terms across Europe.9 To achieve this, the Commission 
intended to update existing disclosure obligations. This resulted in the Transparency 
Directive, which in its first recital states that  
“[t]he disclosure of accurate, comprehensive and timely information about security 
issuers builds sustained investor confidence and allows an informed assessment of 
their business performance and assets. This enhances both investor protection and 
market efficiency.”10  
To this end, according to the Directive, those who hold or have access to voting rights 
should disclose major holdings in listed companies.11  This information 
“should enable investors to acquire or dispose of shares in full knowledge of changes 
in the voting structure; it should also enhance effective control of share issuers and 
                                                
6 Council Directive 88/627/EEC, On the Information to be Published when a Major Holding in a Listed 
Company is Acquired or Disposed Of, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62 (previous directives required issuers to disclose 
information on share ownership, but did not impose such duty directly on shareholders and required less 
disclosure). The European Commission’s rationale for proposing this directive was that investors would be 
provided with information on persons capable of influencing management; this would enable them to “follow 
developments in the company’s ownership and gain a clearer idea of what is happening internally.” This 
information, the Commission considered, might affect investors’ assessment of the securities and play a crucial 
role in their investment decisions. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Information to be 
Published When Major Holdings in the Capital of a Listed Company are Acquired or Disposed Of, at 2, 
COM (1985) 791 final, O.J. (C 351) 8. 
7 See, e.g., THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht eds., Oxford 
University Press 2001). 
8 STRONG BLOCKHOLDERS, WEAK OWNERS AND THE NEED FOR EUROPEAN MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
28, 32 (European Corporate Governance Network Executive Report prepared by Marco Becht 1997). 
9 Communication of the Commission: Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial 
Markets: Action Plan, at 22, COM (1999) 232 (Nov. 11, 1995).  
10 Directive 2004/109/EC, On the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to 
Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market, 2004 O.J. (L 
390) 38 [hereinafter Transparency Directive].  
11 Id. ¶ 2. 
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overall market transparency of important capital movements.”12 
From the recitals and the legislative history of the Directive discussed in further detail 
below, it can be inferred that the main objectives of the European ownership disclosure 
regime are (1) improving market efficiency and (2) improving corporate governance.13  
The following sections explore the different mechanisms through which ownership 
disclosure can perform these tasks. 
A.  The First Objective: Improving Market Efficiency 
One definition of an efficient market is a market in which prices always fully reflect 
available information.14  The traditional argument in support of mandatory issuer disclosure 
is that  
“in the absence of regulation, the existence of externalities will result in market 
failure whereby too little information will be incorporated into share prices. Implicit 
in this position is the belief that mandatory disclosure rules results in meaningful 
issuer disclosures that would otherwise not be forthcoming and that these disclosures 
add to share price accuracy.”15 
An important study has tested this claim empirically by studying the impact of enhanced 
                                                
12 Id. ¶ 18. 
13 Cf. EILÌS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 127, 130 (Cambridge University Press 
2004) 130 (identifying improving share price accuracy and addressing corporate governance agency problems 
as the two key functions of issuer disclosure requirements, and stating that the EU issuer disclosure regime is 
largely designed with a view to improving the accuracy of securities prices in the interests of investor 
protection and market efficiency, but that is has recently started explicitly addressing corporate governance 
disclosures).  
This paper does not separately address the issue of investor protection. For a compelling argument that 
disclosure is irrelevant to investor protection, see Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 
109 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 17, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115361). See also Gaëtane Schaeken Willemaers (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript, 
on file with author) (developing a similar argument in the European context); PAUL DAVIES, THE TAKE-OVER 
BIDDER AND THE POLICY OF DISCLOSURE, in: EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING (Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch 
eds., Butterworths 1991), at 261 (noting that ownership disclosure may be thought to contribute to investor 
confidence, but developing this argument by stating that the focus of the (UK) disclosure rules is on informing 
the market of certain important facts so that other actors can take appropriate decisions, thus promoting 
efficiency). 
For reasons of space, neither does this paper discus how market efficiency and good corporate governance 
can lower the cost of capital. For a discussion, see, e.g., Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in 
Securities Regulation around the World, 2 Brook. J. Corp., Fin. & Com. L. 81, 93 (2007) (the title of which 
has provided loose inspiration for the title of this paper). 
14 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383 
(1970). 
15 Fox et al., supra note 4, at 342. 
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issuer disclosure requirements.16  The authors distinguish between the concept of “price 
accuracy,” which refers to the extent to which share prices offer a good prediction of firms’ 
future cash flows, and “share price informedness”: the extent to which a share price reflects 
the available fundamental information.17  They define “fundamental information” as 
information that helps in predicting future cash flows more precisely.18  The results of the 
study suggest that share prices became more informed as a result of the enhanced disclosure 
requirements, which is interpreted as evidence that mandatory issuer disclosure can increase 
share price accuracy and share price informedness.19  
To determine whether mandatory ownership disclosure could yield similar benefits, the 
key questions are (1) whether information on major shareholdings constitutes fundamental 
information, and (2) whether disclosure of major transactions can be instrumental in 
conveying other, underlying fundamental information to the market.20  The remainder of 
this section argues that both are true. 
1. Transparency of the Voting Structure 
According to the Transparency Directive, disclosure of major holdings should enable 
investors “to acquire or dispose of shares in full knowledge of changes in the voting 
structure.”21  It is useful here to distinguish between the voting structure and changes in the 
voting structure. 
a. The Voting Structure 
The voting structure determines who controls the company, at least to a large extent.22  
Information on the voting structure constitutes fundamental information, because future 
                                                
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 345, 350. 
18 Id. at 348. 
19 Id. at 368. 
20 An important question in the debate on mandatory issuer disclosure is whether it is necessary to 
mandate issuers to disclose information in order for such information to be impounded in share prices. Some 
scholars have argued that issuers can be expected to voluntarily disclose their private information as a signal of 
their products' quality. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 2359, 2373-80 (1998). Even if this argument holds true for issuers, it is doubtful 
whether it does so for shareholders, given the difference in incentives between them. For this reason, it is 
assumed in this paper that a market solution is unlikely to produce a socially desirable level of ownership 
disclosure. 
21 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, ¶ 2. 
22 See infra note 257 and accompanying text. 
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cash flows may vary depending on the allocation of control. One way to see how is by 
looking through the paradigm of agency theory. This shows that different control patterns 
entail different agency costs, as illustrated by the following classic examples: 
In firms with dispersed ownership, no individual shareholder has a strong enough 
incentive to devote resources to ensure that management acts in the interest of the 
shareholder.23  Hence, control is in the hands of management. This implies a risk of 
managerial slacking, which is a source of agency costs.24  By contrast, in firms with 
concentrated ownership the controlling shareholder has a strong incentive to monitor 
management, as do smaller blockholders.25  Of course, not all blockholders may find it 
worthwhile to engage in monitoring.26  But to the extent they do, they could reduce agency 
costs.  
At the same time, blockholders could be a source of new agency costs, notably by 
extracting private benefits (e.g., tunneling).27  There is also a risk of over-monitoring, 
which may discourage management from showing initiative.28  In practice, the behavior of 
blockholders will largely depend on their type (e.g., private investor, institutional 
investor),29  on whether there are other blockholders30  and on the legal environment.31  
                                                
23 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 11 Bell J. Econ. 42 (1980).  
24 ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
112-116 (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1967); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Finan. Econ. 305 
(1976). 
25 See Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer & Josef Zechner, Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and 
Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 1130 (1994). 
26 See, e.g., Marc Goergen, Luc Renneboog & Chendi Zhang, Do UK Institutional Shareholders Monitor 
Their Investee Firms? 8 J. Corp. Law Stud. 39 (2008); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond 
CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 
Vand. L. Rev. 315 (2008). 
27 See HENRY HANSMANN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, AGENCY PROBLEMS AND LEGAL STRATEGIES, in: THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH, REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL. 
22 (Oxford University Press 2004). 
28 Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the 
Firm, 112 Quart. J. Econ. 693 (1997).  
29 See, e.g., Henrik Cronqvist & Rudiger Fahlenbrach, Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies, Rev. 
Fin. Stud. (forthcoming). 
30 Empirical studies suggest that the presence of multiple blockholders can sort different effects: see, e.g., 
Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations, 21 Rev. Financ. 
Stud. 579 (2008) (finding that blockholders fight to form ruling coalitions so that they can extract private 
benefits); Benjamin Maury & Anete Pajuste, Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value, 29 J. Banking 
Finance, 1813 (2005) (finding that firm value increases when voting power is distributed more equally among 
blockholders). 
31 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1652 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge 
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If investors expect the costs resulting from the ownership structure of a particular firm 
to outweigh the benefits, they may discount the share.32  Conversely, if they expect the 
benefits to outweigh the costs, they may be willing to pay more. Because of this trade-off, 
the impact of the ownership structure is likely to be different for each firm.33  The function 
of ownership disclosure is to enable investors to make their own informed assessment as to 
how the ownership structure of a particular firm may impact the value of the share.34  This 
also explains why securities laws typically require disclosure of the ownership structure in 
the prospectus.35  
There is an additional way through which the ownership structure may impact the value 
of the share. While the key component of share prices is the discounted value of expected 
future cash flows, they should also consist of a second component: the value of the vote. 
This value is determined by the likelihood that the vote will be pivotal in a contest for 
control and the price it will yield in such case.36  In firms with highly concentrated 
                                                                                                                                                
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1049 (2007). 
32 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
785 (2003) (discussing the “controlling shareholder tradeoff”).  
33 This may explain why empirical studies into the relationship between types of ownership structure and 
firm value have produced mixed results; for an overview, see Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen & Hans Kurt 
Kvist, Blockholder Ownership: Effects on Firm Value in Market and Control Based Governance Systems, 12 
J. Corp. Finan. 246, 251 (2006). 
Some view the ownership structure of the firm as an endogenous outcome of a maximizing process: Harold 
Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J. Law Econ. 375 (1983); Harold 
Demsetz & Belen Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, 7 J. Corp. Fin. 209 (2001). 
However, recent tests seem to confirm the causal direction. See, e.g., Thomsen, Pedersen & Kvist, supra note 
33; John J. McConnell, Henri Servaes & Karl V. Lins, Changes in Insider Ownership and Changes in the 
Market Value of the Firm, 14 J. Corp. Fin. 92 (2008); Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan & 
Larry H.P Lang, Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. Fin. 
2741, 2764 (2002). But see Rim Zaabar, Stock Price Response to Mandatory Disclosure of Ownership 
Changes: Evidence from France (2008), at 22 (finding no support for a causal interpretation, but offering 
possible explanations). 
34 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24 at 313 (developing a model showing that when prospective 
minority shareholders realize that the manager’s interests diverge from theirs, the price which they will pay for 
shares will reflect the monitoring costs and the effect of the divergence between the manager’s interest and 
theirs); Henry Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and 
Extensions, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 625, 684 (2008); (noting that “[f]rom an economic standpoint, share pricing 
will be more efficient if investors know what major investors are doing”); Donald C. Langevoort, Managing 
the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: the SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 Vill. L. 
Rev. 1139, 1152 (2003) (noting that the two functions of issuer disclosure, improving market efficiency and 
addressing agency problems, are inseparable insofar as a valuation decision is impossible without an 
assessment of the risk that incumbent management will divert to itself the otherwise expected stream of 
earnings). 
35 For the EU, see Directive 2003/71/EC, On the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are Offered to 
the Public or Admitted to Trading, Annex I, section VIII, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64; Commission Regulation 
809/2004, As Regards Information Contained in Prospectuses as well as the Format, Incorporation by 
Reference and Publication of such Prospectuses and Dissemination of Advertisements, Annex I, items 18.1-
18.4, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1. 
36 Luigi Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Quart. J. Econ. 1048 (1995). 
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ownership, the likelihood of a control contest will generally be small compared to 
firms with dispersed ownership. Thus, the ownership structure has an impact on the value of 
the share via its effects on the probability of a control contest.37  
b. Changes in the Voting Structure  
If information on corporate control is fundamental information, then so must be 
information on a potential shift in corporate control. Indeed, the rationale of the US 
disclosure regime is “to alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or 
accumulation of securities, regardless of technique employed, which might represent a 
potential shift in corporate control.”38  This would enable corporations, their shareholders 
and potential investors to evaluate the possible effects of a change in substantial 
shareholdings.39  
A potential shift in corporate control can impact the value of the share in any of the 
ways described earlier. The appearance of a potential buyer, for example a raider or a 
competitor, could signal an increased probability of a control contest. This should increase 
the value of the share, a prediction supported by evidence.40  Alternatively, the appearance 
of an activist hedge fund could signal an increase in monitoring, which explains why 
empirical studies show abnormal returns around the disclosure of purchases by hedge funds.41  
                                                
37 Id. at 1048. 
38 GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 US 910 (1972). 
39 It would also enable evaluation of the possible effects of a tender offer. 111 Cong. Rec. 28,259 (1965) 
(remarks of senator Williams). But see Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffrey M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the 
Regulatory Process, 65 Wash. U.L.Q. 131, 144 (1987) (suggesting incumbent management may be the 
primary beneficiary) (for a discussion of public choice theory, see infra note 130 and accompanying text and 
infra note 242 and accompanying text). See also Hu & Black, supra note 34, at (noting that “[f]rom an 
economic standpoint, share pricing will be more efficient if investors (…) have advance notice of possible 
changes in control.”) 
40 See, e.g., W.H. Mikkelson & R.S. Ruback, An Empirical Analysis of the Interfirm Equity Investment 
Process, J. Finan. Econ. 14, 523, 534, 535 (1985) (measuring the announcement effects of US 13D filings in 
the period 1978-80 and documenting that acquisitions by parties who have disclosed that they consider an 
acquisition of the target result in a statistically significant abnormal return of 7.74% (average two-day initial 
announcement prediction error). 
41 Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Randall S. Thomas & Frank Partnoy, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729, 1755 (2006) (using a sample consisting of 1,059 hedge 
fund-target pairs for the period 2001-2006, the authors measure effects of Schedule 13D filings and document 
abnormal return of approx. 2.0% on the filing day and the following day; afterwards, the abnormal returns keep 
trending up to a total 7.2% in twenty days. The authors conclude that share prices adjust to a level reflecting 
the expected benefit of intervention, adjusted for the equilibrium probability that the fund continues with its 
activism and succeeds); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds 
and Other Private Investors, 64 J. Fin 187, 208 (2009) (finding statistically significant mean market-adjusted 
returns of 7.2% over the [–30, +30] window around filing and concluding that the market perceives substantial 
benefits upon learning that a firm is targeted by a hedge fund activist). 
  11 
Conversely, the exit of an influential shareholder can signal a reduction in monitoring 
and adversely affect share value. This is illustrated by an empirical study of share price 
responses in France, which is characterized by family control of listed firms. The study 
finds negative abnormal returns following sales of substantial stakes and concludes that this 
is consistent with the view that monitoring by large shareholders increases shareholder 
value.42  In sum, the market’s response to the shift in control will depend on the past 
behavior of the exiting shareholder or the expected behavior of the incoming shareholder. 
2. Transparency of Capital Movements 
Disclosure of major shareholdings, according to the Transparency Directive, should also 
enhance “overall market transparency of important capital movements.”43  As we will see 
below, such transparency may improve market efficiency through several mechanisms. 
a. Transparency of Economic Interest 
The European Commission’s initial proposal for the Directive envisaged that disclosure 
would not only be triggered by exceeding a threshold percentage of voting rights, but also by 
exceeding a threshold percentage of the capital.44  Moreover, when filing the notification, 
not only voting rights but also capital interests (i.e., cash flow rights) would have had to be 
disclosed. These provisions did not make it into the final version of the Directive.45  
Nonetheless, it is instructive to consider the rationale of requiring disclosure of cash flow 
rights. 
According to the Commission, disclosure of cash flow rights would have reflected “not 
only the actual influence an investor on securities markets may take in a publicly traded 
                                                                                                                                                
In practice, the line between share price revisions due to the prospect of a takeover and revisions due to the 
prospect of shareholder activism is somewhat blurry. Brav et al., at 1758, show that acquisitions by hedge 
funds that can be interpreted as a prelude to a sale of the target company yield the highest returns relative to 
other types of activism. These findings are consistent with an empirical study by Robin M. Greenwood & 
Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, J. Finan. Econ. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 29, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003792). 
42 Zaabar, supra note 33, at 18 (finding statistically significant abnormal returns of -2.33% during the [-1, 
+3] window around the disclosure). 
43 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, ¶ 18. 
44 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of 
Transparency Requirements with Regard to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to 
Trading on a Regulated Market, at 43, COM (2003) 138 final (March 26, 2003). 
45 Accordingly, the various references to “capital” were deleted, with the exception of the reference to 
“transparency of important capital movements” in recital (18) of the Directive. This raises the question of 
whether this reference might have been unintentionally included. This paper assumes that is not the case. 
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company, but more generally its major interest in the company performance, business 
strategy and earnings.”46  Such disclosure, however, was only found necessary in case of 
deviations from one share-one vote.47  Studies show that European firms frequently deviate 
from one-share one vote, including by issuing shares with multiple voting rights or non-
voting preference shares.48  Apparently, the Commission deemed it desirable that there be 
transparency of cash flow rights in these firms.  
Why do cash flow rights matter? Because they determine the extent to which a 
controlling shareholder bears the cost of private benefit extraction and the benefit from 
increased monitoring. If voting rights exceed cash flow rights, this encourages private 
benefit extraction because a disproportionate share of the costs thereof will be borne by 
outside investors. Theoretical models show that disproportionate structures can distort the 
controlling shareholder’s incentives to make efficient decisions with respect to project 
selection, firm size and roles of control.49  Other models show they can distort the market 
for corporate control.50   
Conversely, higher cash flow ownership discourages private benefit extraction by 
making it costlier. It also provides the controlling shareholder with a greater incentive to 
monitor management and to encourage it to optimize cash flow through dividends. In sum, 
cash flow rights determine the extent to which the controlling shareholder’s interests are 
aligned with the interests of outside investors. The case for one share-one vote, therefore, 
turns primarily on its ability to match economic incentives with voting power.51  
Still, it remains controversial whether mandating one share-one vote would be socially 
beneficial, as illustrated by the hefty debate that has recently taken place in Europe over 
                                                
46 Id. at 18. 
47 Id. at 44 (stating that “[t]he proportion of capital need be notified only to the extent that the [home 
jurisdiction] allows multiple voting rights to attach to shares and the issuer provides accordingly in its 
statutes or instruments of incorporation”). Article 4 (1) of Council Directive 88/627/EEC (the Transparency 
Directive’s predecessor), supra note 6, contained a similar provision. 
48 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership around 
the World, 54 J. Fin. 471, 499 (1999); M. Faccio & L. H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western 
European Corporations, 65 J. Finan. Econ. 365, 389 (2002); REPORT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, ECGI, ISS EUROPE AND SHEARMAN & STERLING (2007), at 24, 25. 
49 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier H. Kraakman & George G. Triantis, STOCK PYRAMIDS, CROSS-
OWNERSHIP, AND DUAL CLASS EQUITY: THE MECHANISMS AND AGENCY COSTS OF SEPARATING CONTROL 
FROM CASH-FLOW RIGHTS, in: CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (R. Morck ed., University of 
Chicago Press 2000), at 295. 
50 Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. 
Finan. Econ. 175 (1988). 
51 Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 
1911, 1945 (1996). 
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this issue.52  While it may be true that disproportionate voting rights encourage private 
benefit extraction, they also provide a cheaper way to monitor management.53  As a result, 
the effects of shifting to one share-one vote are likely to vary per firm. The main 
objection against mandating one share-one vote, therefore, is that one size does not fit all. 
The case for transparency of disproportionality between voting rights and cash flow 
rights, however, is much stronger. Transparency signals that the controlling shareholder’s 
incentives are distorted, and thus enables investors to better anticipate agency costs.54  Some 
scholars even argue that as long as companies make adequate disclosure, there is little 
justification to restrict the ability to deviate from one share-one vote.55  Empirical studies 
confirm that outside investors price in the expected costs and benefits of 
disproportionality. They tend to positively value the incentive effect of cash flow 
ownership, while negatively valuing the entrenchment effect of disproportionate voting 
rights.56  This is consistent with the notion that disproportionality can impact the firm’s 
future cash flows, and that information on disproportionality is therefore fundamental 
information. 
b. Transparency of Trading Interest  
Transparency of “important capital movements” may also enable the market to 
understand the interest in the share. As we will see below, disclosure of major transactions 
can be instrumental in conveying other, underlying fundamental information to the market, 
                                                
52 This debate was ended abruptly late 2007 when Commissioner McCreevy announced he would not 
further pursue the issue. Speech by Commissioner McCreevy at the European Parliament's Legal Affairs 
Committee (Oct. 3, 2007). This decision was based in part on two academic studies: Mike C. Burkart & 
Samuel Lee, One Share -One Vote: the Theory, 12 Rev. Finance 1 (2008) and Renee B. Adams & Daniel 
Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence 12 Rev. Finance 51 (2008). 
53 For a discussion of the costs associated with holding large blocks and with monitoring, see Admati, 
Pfleiderer & Zechner, supra note 25. 
54 See HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, REPORT ON ISSUES RELATED TO TAKEOVER BIDS 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002), at 25. 
55 Arman Khachaturyan, Trapped in Delusions: Democracy, Fairness and the One-Share-One-Vote Rule in 
the European Union, 8 EBOR 335, 357 (2007). 
56 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection 
and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. Fin. 1147 (2002) (finding higher valuation (measured by Tobin's Q) of firms 
with higher cash flow ownership by the controlling shareholder); Claessens et al., supra note 33, at 2755 
(using a sample of East Asian firms and finding that for the largest shareholders, the difference between control 
rights and cash flow rights is associated with a value discount, and the discount generally increases with the 
size of the wedge and that firm value decreases when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its 
cash flow ownership); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country 
Analysis, 68 J. Finan. Econ. 325, 327 (2003) (showing that where private benefit extraction is expected to be 
high, non-voting shares trade at a deep discount over voting shares). 
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thereby accelerating the process whereby such information is impounded in share 
prices. 
The starting point of this line of reasoning is that investors may possess fundamental 
information that is not yet impounded in share prices. Of course, in a perfectly efficient 
market this would not be possible. But the evidence suggests that equity markets are merely 
semi-strong form efficient with respect to easily obtained and easily interpreted 
information.57  This means there is still money to be made by trading on information that, 
although public, is hard to obtain or interpret. A trader with the resources to gather and 
analyze such information may conclude that the share is overvalued or undervalued and 
capitalize on this insight by selling or buying shares, respectively.58  
Once the trader starts trading, the fundamental information is impounded in the share 
price through several mechanisms. First, even in liquid markets major shifts in supply and 
demand can impact the share price directly, pushing the share price towards a new 
equilibrium.59  Second, the resulting movement in share price may enable price decoding by 
other traders who suspect the trading against the market signals the presence of 
fundamental information and start trading in the same direction.60  Third, the trading may 
enable trade decoding.61   
Trade decoding occurs when the attention of other traders is captured by unusual trades. 
Whether such trades signal the presence of fundamental information will depend on factors 
such as the volume of the trades, the sequence of trades, the purpose of the trades, the 
resulting ownership level and last but not least, the identity of the trader – Warren Buffet is 
but one example of an investor perceived to be well informed.62  If other traders become 
convinced the trades are driven by fundamental information, they will start mimicking the 
informed trader. As a result, the process whereby the fundamental information is 
                                                
57 LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES 240 (Oxford University Press 2003). 
58 See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 
711, 723 (2006) (referring to this type of traders as “information traders,” comprising sophisticated 
professional investors and analysts). 
59 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 
570 (1984). 
60 Id. at 575. 
61 Id. 
62 See Aslihan Bozcuk & M. Ameziane Lasfer, The Information Content of Institutional Trades on the 
London Stock Exchange, 40 J. Finan. Quant. Anal. 621, 638 (2005); David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, Price, 
Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets, 19 J. Finan. Econ. 69 (1987); David Hirshleifer & Siew 
Hong Teoh, Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a Review and Synthesis, 9 Europ. Finan. 
Manage. 25, 48 (2003). 
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impounded in the share price is accelerated. 
How do uninformed traders become aware of unusual trades? Potential sources of 
information are the trading book and the stock exchange’s transaction reporting system, 
but these offer limited insight. Traders are able to conceal the volume of their transaction 
by conducting a series of smaller transactions over time or placing iceberg orders.63  They 
are also able to remain anonymous, through the use of intermediaries or by trading in so-
called dark pools, trading venues that do not publicly display bid and offer quotes.64  Finally, 
they are not required to disclose their intentions or their resulting ownership level. 
This brings us to an alternative means through which uninformed traders are alerted: 
public disclosure of major transactions. Consider the disclosure by a passive mutual fund 
manager that it has sold its substantial stake in a portfolio company. The sale may be 
driven by a need for liquidity or a desire to rebalance the portfolio. But it may also be 
driven by the possession of fundamental information. Thus, the market may interpret the 
sale as a signal that the share is overvalued. 
Whether there is marginal value in mandating disclosure of major transactions depends 
on how rapidly the fundamental information conveyed by such transactions is impounded in 
the share price. Clearly, there would be little point in mandating disclosure if the 
fundamental information would become fully reflected in the share price even before the 
disclosure is made. But the evidence suggests that, generally, this is not the case. Empirical 
studies of announcement effects show abnormal returns on both transaction dates and 
announcement dates, even if there is no overlap between the two.65  The impact of 
disclosure is nicely illustrated by the following chart, which shows that abnormal returns 
surrounding major transactions by hedge funds see a jump of about 2.0% on the filing day 
and the following day.66  
                                                
63 Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auction and Insider Trading, 53 Econometrica 1315 (1985); Sugato 
Chakravarty, Stealth-trading: Which Traders’ Trades Move Stock Prices? 61 J. Fin. Econ. 289 (2001). 
64 See Hans A. Degryse, Mark Van Achter & Gunther Wuyts, Shedding Light on Dark Liquidity Pools 
(manuscript at 3, 6, 13, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1303482). 
65 FSA, DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCES, CONSULTATION AND DRAFT HANDBOOK TEXT 
(CP 07/20) (2007), annex 3, at 14 (examining the impact on share prices of announcements in the UK in the 
period January 2006-August 2006 for a subsample of events non-overlapping with disclosure and documenting 
statistically significant abnormal returns of 0.36% over the [-1, +1] window around the disclosure date). In 
annex 2 of the same document, the FSA surveys the finance literature, and concludes that there can be benefits 
from disclosure in relation to price efficiency. 
66 Brav et al., supra note 41, at 1755. Brav et al. note that for a subsample of events for which the time of 
the Schedule 13D filing coincides with the first public announcement of activism in which a hedge fund 
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FIGURE 1 
BUY-AND-HOLD ABNORMAL RETURN AROUND THE FILING OF SCHEDULE 13DS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brav at et al. (2008) 67   
The abnormal returns could, of course, be the mere consequence of the control 
implications of the transactions. In fact, this is the most likely explanation for the jump in 
abnormal returns shown in Figure 1, which focuses on filings by activist hedge funds.68  
These transactions do not necessarily convey underlying fundamental information; rather, 
the transactions themselves constitute fundamental information. So we need to take a 
closer look at the evidence and filter out transactions with control implications. This is 
challenging, because it is not always clear upon disclosure what the control implications are. 
Two variables are particularly relevant here: the identity of the trader and the purpose of 
the transaction. 
                                                                                                                                                
describes a new and explicit agenda in the Schedule 13D beyond a general statement of maximizing 
shareholder value on the filing, the magnitude of abnormal returns is even higher, with the average abnormal 
return during the (–20, 20) window being 8.4%. Id. at 1756.  
67 Id. at 1756. The solid line (left axis) plots the average buy-and-hold return around the Schedule 13D 
filing, in excess of the buy-and-hold return of the value-weight market, from 20 days prior the Schedule 13D 
file date to 20 days afterward. The bars (right axis) plot the increase (in percentage points) in the share trading 
turnover during the same time window compared to the average turnover rate during the preceding (–100, –40) 
event window. 
68 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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US disclosure rules provide some insight into the purpose of a transaction, at least at the 
time of the transaction. Qualified parties who purchase shares without the purpose or effect 
of changing or influencing the control of the issuer file a statement on Schedule 13G, 
otherwise on Schedule 13D.69  This has enabled an empirical study that examines the 
differences between the same blockholder’s passive (13G) and active (13D) holdings. The 
study finds that not only filings of active holdings produce abnormal returns, but also filings 
of passive holdings, even though the returns are smaller.70  
By contrast, to draw conclusions from empirical studies with respect to firms listed in 
Europe, one will often need to rely on the identity of the trader as a proxy for control 
implications. For example, mutual fund managers may be less likely to monitor than family 
investors, and more likely to gather and analyze complex information on the fundamental 
value of the share. But mutual fund managers too may act as monitors, and it therefore 
remains challenging to determine to what extent announcement effects are driven by 
control implications or by value implications. Empirical studies measuring the 
announcement effects of transactions by investors who are relatively likely to be perceived 
as informed traders document abnormal returns, though again, they are modest.71  
What matters for present purposes, however, is not the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns. It is the mere fact that the market responds, at least on average, to the disclosure 
of transactions that are relatively likely to be driven by fundamental information. This is 
consistent with the notion that such disclosure can convey underlying fundamental 
information to the market and thereby accelerate the process whereby such information is 
impounded in share prices. 
                                                
69 Exchange Act Rule 13d-1(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1. If the investor changes his intention after filing a 
Schedule 13G, he will need to file a Schedule 13D. For a description of the rule, see infra note 161. 
70 Christopher Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists 14 J. 
Corp. Finan. 323, 329 (2008) (using a sample of activism campaigns in the US by hedge funds from 1998-
2005 and documenting statistically significant market-adjusted returns of 1.64% (passive) and 3.39% (active) 
over a [-2, +2] window around the disclosure date). 
71 Bozcuk & Lasfer, supra note 62, at 631 (measuring announcements effects of institutional block trading 
activity on the London Stock Exchange from 1993 to 1999 and finding that buys by fund managers result in 
statistically significant abnormal returns both on the announcement date (CAR [-1, +1] = +1.17%) and in the 
post-event period (CAR [+2, +40] = 2.33%), and that large sales result in negative abnormal returns on the 
announcement date (CAR [-1, +1] = - 0.83%) and in the post-event period (CAR [+2, +40] = -2.39%)); FSA, 
supra note 65, annex 3 at 13 (measuring the announcement effects of sales by asset managers and documenting 
statistically significant abnormal returns (CAR [-2, +2] = - 0.39%). See also Steven R. Bishop, Pre-Bid 
Acquisitions and Substantial Shareholder Notices, 16 Australian J. Manage 1, 19 (1991) (measuring the 
announcement effects of acquisitions by financial institutions in Australia and documenting statistically 
significant abnormal returns (CAR’s of –2.0% in the month prior to disclosure and 0.27% in the month after 
disclosure). 
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* * * 
One implication of this reasoning is that disclosure of short positions could also 
contribute to market efficiency. After all, short sales are particularly likely to be driven by 
fundamental information.72  There is some evidence that disclosure of short sales triggers a 
significant market response.73  This suggests that disclosure accelerates the rate at which 
fundamental information is impounded in share prices.74   
For this reason, a number of countries require disclosure of short positions to the 
market.75  Their number has increased significantly over the recent years, as regulators 
across the globe have responded to the recent financial crisis by tightening disclosure 
requirements.76  These measures, though, appear to be primarily driven by concerns about 
market abuse.77  Indeed, many countries only require that short positions be reported to the 
regulator.78  
Even if disclosure can accelerate the process whereby fundamental information is 
impounded in share prices, one should be cautious in concluding that mandating disclosure 
for this reason would necessarily result in markets becoming more efficient. One reason for 
caution is that, as the behavioral finance literature teaches us, investors may not necessarily 
respond rationally. The recent financial crisis has given skeptics further reason to doubt the 
market’s ability to correctly estimate fundamental values.79  Thus, the FSA recently warned 
                                                
72 See Ekkehart Boehmer, Charles M. Jones & Xiaoyan Zhang, Which Shorts are Informed?, 63 J. Fin. 
491 (2008). 
73 Michael J. Aitken, Alex Frino, Michael S. McCorry & Peter L. Swan, Short Sales Are Almost 
Instantaneously Bad News: Evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange, 53 J. Fin. 2205 (1998) (studying a 
market setting in which information on short trades is transparent just after execution and finding that 
disclosure of such trades causes prices to decline immediately). 
74 Id. at 2222. 
75 See IOSCO, REPORT ON TRANSPARENCY OF SHORT SELLING 14, 21 (2003) (noting that “[a] number of 
countries take the view that there is value in the disclosure of short selling to market users and provide for 
transparency in their short selling regimes,” and providing an overview of such countries). 
76 See, e.g., FSA, Short Selling (No 4) Instrument 2008/60 (2008). For an overview of reporting 
obligations imposed by various regulators, see INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS 
(IOSCO), REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING - LONSULTATION REPORT 25 (2009).  
77 See infra note 198 and accompanying text. But see FSA, SHORT SELLING, DP09/1 24, 29 (2009) 
(noting that transparency of short selling can improve pricing efficiency by conveying a signal to the market 
that a firm is overvalued, and proposing disclosure of short positions by individual investors to the market). 
78 See IOSCO, supra note 75, at 25. 
79 See FSA, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 40, 42 
(2009) (noting that “[i]n the face of the worst financial crisis for a century, however, the assumptions of 
efficient market theory have been subject to increasingly effective criticism”, and that “the acceptance that 
financial markets are inherently susceptible to irrational momentum effects does imply that regulatory 
approaches should be based on striking a balance between the benefits of market completion and market 
liquidity and the potential disadvantages which may arise from inherent instabilities in liquid markets”). But 
see Hirshleifer & Teoh, supra note 62, at 26, 52 (noting that practitioners and the media tend to conclude too 
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that disclosure of short sales may cause herd behavior, triggering excessive sales and price 
declines.80   
Another reason for caution is that by reducing the rewards of trading on fundamental 
information, disclosure reduces the incentives to search for such information. As Grossman 
and Stiglitz observed nearly thirty years ago, “[t]here is a fundamental conflict between the 
efficiency with which markets spread information and the incentives to acquire 
information.”81  Moreover, investors who are reluctant to reveal their trading strategies 
may limit their trading activity to avoid triggering disclosure, which could adversely affect 
liquidity.82  Mandating disclosure also entails other costs, as we will see below. 
c. Transparency of Free Float 
Finally, transparency of “important capital movements” enables the market to 
estimate the size of the free float. In at least one European country this is an explicit 
objective of the ownership disclosure regime, and perhaps for a good reason: the size of the 
free float may impact liquidity, which in turn may impact the share price.83  
First, consider the link between free float and liquidity, that is, the ability to quickly 
trade large size at low cost.84  One can imagine this becomes harder as the number of free-
floating shares becomes smaller. There is some research suggesting that a decrease in the 
free float does indeed adversely affect liquidity, but compelling evidence is scarce.85  This is 
different for the link between liquidity and share price. Several studies have tested and 
confirmed the hypothesis that the more illiquid the stock, the higher the expected return, 
                                                                                                                                                
easily that there is irrational herding.) 
80 FSA, TEMPORARY SHORT SELLING MEASURES, CP09/1, 10, 11 (2009). See also FSA, supra note 77, 
at 25; IOSCO, supra note 75, at 15 (noting that “general trading data often reflects no more than short-term 
technical adjustments and could be wrongly interpreted). 
81 Sanford Grossman & Joseph Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 
Amer. Econ. Rev. 393, 405 (1980). See also Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid 
Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk Implications, 14 Europ. Finan. Manage. 663, 671 (2008) 
(describing the different effects of disclosure rules and noting that “it is unclear, either theoretically or 
empirically, which disclosure rules are optimal.”) 
82 For instance, hedge fund managers have expressed concern that disclosure of their short sales will 
encourage mimicking of their trading strategies by other investors: Peter Smith, Fund Heads Voice Short 
Selling Fears, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008. 
83 Explanatory Memorandum to Dutch ownership disclosure rules, Kamerstukken II, 2002–2003, 28 985, 
no. 3, at 3. 
84 Harris, supra note 57, at 399. 
85 Kalok Chan, Yue-Cheong Chan & Wai-Ming Fong, Free Float And Market Liquidity: A Study Of 
Hong Kong Government Intervention, 27 J. Finan. Res. 179, 181 (2004). 
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and thus the lower the share price.86  
The function of disclosure of major shareholdings, then, would be to enable investors to 
understand the implications of the size of the free float. Are there one or more large 
shareholders who are likely to hold on to their shares, for example to exercise control, and 
how does this affect liquidity? Taking into account expected trading costs, what is a 
particular share worth paying for? Mandatory ownership disclosure may help answering 
these questions.  
Of course, there are more direct ways of assessing liquidity, notably by looking at 
trading volume. Ownership disclosure therefore would seem particularly useful to the extent 
it can help the market interpret changes in liquidity. Consider the hypothetical where a 
reduction in the free-float causes a decline in trading volume and the decline in trading 
volume causes the bid-ask spread to widen. Market participants could interpret this widening 
as a signal that someone is trading on private information and may become reluctant to 
trade. If, however, they are enabled to interpret these developments as the mere result of a 
reduction in the free float, they may be more likely to continue to trade, thus contributing 
to liquidity and ultimately market efficiency. 
B.  The Second Objective: Improving Corporate Governance 
The analysis so far suggests that an appropriate degree of transparency of major 
shareholdings can improve market efficiency, primarily by enabling investors to anticipate 
agency costs. This may explain why a recent survey among institutional investors shows 
that they consider such transparency important for their investment decisions.87  Yet 
another explanation is that they consider transparency important because it can play an 
active role in reducing those costs.88  Indeed, there is a substantial body of literature 
discussing mandatory disclosure as a means to address agency problems.89  
Agency problems and the challenge to mitigate resulting costs form the centerpiece of 
                                                
86 See, e.g., Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J. Finan. 
Econ. 223 (1986); Claudio Loderer & Lukas Roth, The Pricing Discount for Limited Liquidity: Evidence 
from SWX Swiss Exchange and the Nasdaq, 12 J. Empirical Finance 239, 240 (2005). 
87 Joseph A. McCahery & Zacharias Sautner, Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences 
of Institutional Investors (manuscript, at 30, 40, on file with author). 
88 Id. at 11. 
89 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1047 (1995); Fox, supra note 13.  
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corporate governance. In Europe, the High Level Group of Company Law Experts has 
emphasized the potential of disclosure as a mechanism to improve corporate governance.90  
The European Commission shares this view, as becomes clear, for example, from the 
recitals of its Recommendation on executive remuneration: 
“The disclosure of accurate and timely information by the issuers of securities 
builds sustained investor confidence and constitutes an important tool for promoting 
sound corporate governance throughout the Community. To that end, it is 
important that listed companies display appropriate transparency in dealings with 
investors, so as to enable them to express their view [emphasis added].”91  
In a similar vein, one of the aims of the Transparency Directive is to “enhance 
effective control of share issuers” by mandating ownership disclosure.92  As we will see 
below, there are two mechanisms through which ownership disclosure can improve 
corporate governance. 
1. Ownership Disclosure as an Enforcement Mechanism 
In the words of Reinier Kraakman, disclosure can facilitate enforcement insofar as it 
“discourages opportunism in its own right” and “permits other legal controls that deter self-
dealing decisions by corporate insiders.”93  To see how ownership disclosure can do this, it is 
useful to distinguish between firms with dispersed ownership and firms with concentrated 
ownership, as their need for enforcement is different. 
a. Firms with Concentrated Share Ownership  
Many European firms have concentrated ownership.94  In these firms, there is not a 
problem of “strong managers, weak owners” but rather of “strong blockholders, weak 
                                                
90 A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE, REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL 
GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS, 33, 45, 95 (2002). 
91 Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC, Fostering an Appropriate Regime for the Remuneration of 
Directors of Listed Companies, ¶ 3, 2004 O.J. (L 385) 55; see also ¶ 9.  
92 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, ¶ 18. 
93 REINIER KRAAKMAN, DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN OVERVIEW ESSAY, in: 
REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2004), at 96. The 
following discussion focuses on enforcement by shareholders and enforcement agencies, but in a broader sense 
transparency can have value to creditors, employees and other stakeholders. 
94 See Barca & Becht, supra note 7, at 19; La Porta et al., supra note 48, at 492; Faccio & Lang, supra 
note 48, at 379. 
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owners.”95  Because of the potential of private benefit extraction by blockholders and 
the resulting need for monitoring of their behavior, disclosure of major holdings is 
particularly important for these firms.96  Three examples illustrate this. 
First, disclosure may expose the potential for trading on inside information or other 
forms of market abuse. Large shareholders can be expected to have access to inside 
information more readily than small shareholders. Under US law, holders of a 10% stake are 
even deemed to possess insider information, and their trading activity is therefore subject to 
stringent disclosure requirements.97  The European Commission had the same concern in 
mind when it proposed the rules on disclosure of major holdings; this would prevent 
“uncontrollable rumors” and stop “misuse of price-sensitive information.”98  
Today, the primary instrument to prevent this is the European Market Abuse Directive, 
which contains rules aimed at safeguarding market integrity.99  The Transparency Directive 
has a complementary function by identifying shareholders who are not on an insider list, 
but may nonetheless have access to inside information and may be tempted to use it. This 
facilitates private or public enforcement. Disclosure may also prevent those whose interests 
are exposed from engaging in market abuse in the first place, consistent with the notion 
that sunlight is the best disinfectant.100  
Second, disclosure of the identity of the person who ultimately controls the firm makes 
it easier to detect diversion of corporate assets.101  Such diversion may occur, for example, 
through related party transactions that are not conducted at arms’ length (tunneling).  
To be sure, in many jurisdictions, issuer disclosure rules already require disclosure of 
related party transactions. But at least in Europe, these rules only require periodic 
disclosure.102  What is needed is some degree of ex ante disclosure.103  This alerts outsiders to 
                                                
95 Becht, supra note 8, at 4. 
96 Id. at 60. See also NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 169 (Oxford University Press 
2002); DANIEL GROSS & KAREL LANNOO, THE EURO CAPITAL MARKET 127 (Wiley 1999). 
97 Exchange Act Rule 16a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2005). 
98 European Commission, supra note 6, at 2. 
99 Directive 2003/6/EC, On Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 096) 
16 [hereinafter Market Abuse Directive]. 
100 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Frederick A. 
Stokes Company 1914). 
101 Ferrell, supra note 13, at 89. 
102 Directive 78/660/EEC, supra note 35, art. 43 (1) 7(b); Directive 83/349/EEC, supra note 35, art. 34 
7(b); Transparency Directive, supra note 10, art. 5 (4); IAS 24. 
103 See Black, supra note 34, at 1588 (noting that insiders have an incentive to disguise their share 
ownership in a company, and other companies that the first company deals with, in order to conceal their 
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potential conflicts of interest, which may induce them to monitor more intensely. This, in 
turn, may discourage the controlling shareholder from engaging in tunneling in the first 
place. In spite of these benefits, research suggests that continental European countries still 
have relatively few ex ante disclosure requirements.104  Particularly for those countries, 
ownership disclosure may constitute a useful form of ex ante disclosure. 
Lastly, ownership disclosure can enable shareholders to make informed corporate 
governance decisions, such as choosing directors or authorizing fundamental transactions.105  
In Europe, both the Transparency Directive and the Shareholders’ Rights Directive aim to 
ensure that shareholders can exercise their rights in an informed manner.106  Ownership 
disclosure contributes to this, again, by exposing potential conflicts of interest. 
Of course, even if it is clear that there is a conflict of interest, the controlling 
shareholder will, as a practical matter, determine the outcome of the vote. This limits the 
extent to which ownership disclosure can improve the quality of the shareholder 
decisionmaking process in firms with concentrated ownership.107  To counter this problem, 
related party transactions are often subject to exclusive approval by the noninterested 
shareholders. In those cases, ownership disclosure fulfills a special role. As Bernard Black 
has argued, “insiders have a further incentive to disguise their ownership, so they can 
pretend to be noninterested [and vote]. Disclosure rules, and rules that treat affiliates of 
insiders as interested shareholders, are needed to prevent this.”108  This is one of the reasons 
why he counts ownership disclosure among the “core institutions” that control self-dealing. 
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* * * 
Empirical studies underscore the role of disclosure in mitigating agency costs. One study 
finds that high disclosure standards are strongly associated with lower levels of private 
benefits.109  This finding is consistent with the law and finance literature. In a recent study, 
La Porta et al. construe a “disclosure index” that includes ownership disclosure as a variable. 
They find that as disclosure improves, the size of the block premium decreases.110   
True, the law and finance literature has been subject to criticism.111  But even scholars 
who have gone so far as to construe a new “shareholder protection index” have 
consistently included ownership disclosure as a variable.112  This means they too are of the 
view that ownership disclosure can protect minority shareholders, the principal argument 
made here and implicitly adopted by the European Commission.113  
Finally, while the importance of ownership disclosure in this context should not be 
underestimated, neither should it be overestimated. Shareholders who have amassed such a 
large stake that they are able to engage in abusive behavior are likely to be known even if 
they have not publicly disclosed their stake. Moreover, in terms of enforcement, ownership 
disclosure merely represents a first step. The quality of minority shareholder protection will 
largely depend on minority shareholders’ ability to hold the controlling shareholder 
accountable. Still, the fact that mandatory ownership disclosure ensures that investors and 
regulators are timely informed of potential conflicts of interest, suggests it has marginal 
value. 
b. Firms with Dispersed Share Ownership  
While many European firms are characterized by concentrated ownership, there are also 
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numerous firms with dispersed ownership, particularly in the UK.114  How does ownership 
disclosure reduce agency costs in these firms?  
Before answering this question, it is important to nuance the distinction between firms 
with dispersed ownership and firms with concentrated ownership. As pointed out by John 
Armour and Jeffrey Gordon, we can distinguish two types of firms with dispersed 
ownership.115  One is characterized by retail ownership and predominantly found in the US; 
the other by institutional ownership and predominantly found in the UK. Multiple 
blockholders can together increase agency costs much like a single controlling shareholder 
can, by conspiring to extract private benefits.116  This risk of “intra-shareholder agency 
costs” requires the same type of enforcement as in firms with concentrated ownership, 
discussed earlier. Armour and Gordon suggest that this explains why the UK has stringent 
ownership disclosure rules compared to the US.117  
In terms of reducing managerial agency costs, however, the function of ownership 
disclosure applies in roughly the same way to both types of firms with dispersed ownership. 
This is by facilitating the market for corporate control, the mechanism through which 
management is disciplined by takeovers and the threat thereof. 
To be sure, the tone of the political debate at the level of individual European countries 
suggests that, to put it mildly, vulnerability to takeovers is not always desired. Inevitably, 
this has ramifications at European level – the complicated legislative process preceding the 
Takeover Directive springs to mind.118  Still, it appears that at least the European 
Commission believes in the virtues of the market for corporate control. The very reason it 
proposed the Takeover Directive was to create favorable conditions for the emergence of a 
European market for corporate control.119  One such condition is that the initial threshold 
for ownership disclosure is set at the right level, which can be explained as follows. 
On the one hand, ownership disclosure can positively impact the market for corporate 
control. First, by understanding who is in control and determining the size of the free float, 
potential bidders can estimate the likelihood that their bid will succeed. The High Level 
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Group correctly observed that the lack of transparency of the ownership structure 
may result in malfunctioning of the market for corporate control.120  Hence, the Takeover 
Directive now requires significant direct and indirect shareholdings to be published in the 
annual report.121   
Second, transparency of major holdings enables the potential bidder to identify parties 
who could be approached for irrevocable undertakings.  
Third, disclosure enables other potential bidders to mount a competing offer by alerting 
them that a third party is amassing a stake in the target. Disclosure matters here since the 
larger the toehold, the smaller the likelihood that a competing offer will succeed. This is 
because the initial bidder will partially bid for its own shares, and is therefore able to pay a 
higher price on the whole.122  A toehold can also offer a strategic advantage vis-à-vis 
competing bidders, since the refusal of the initial bidder to tender its shares in a competing 
bid could hamper competing bidders’ ability to squeeze out the minority upon completion 
of their bid. 
The flipside of the coin is that mandatory disclosure of stakebuilding can discourage the 
initial bidder from making a bid in the first place, at least when the threshold that triggers 
disclosure is set too low. This is because such threshold limits the size of the toehold a 
potential bidder can silently purchase, and the gains he can realize as a result thereof.123   
The bidder’s gains from stakebuilding can be considered from different perspectives. 
From an efficiency perspective, they can be considered as a reward for the effort of 
searching for potential synergies.124  They can also be considered as a means to finance the 
relatively high bid premium that target shareholders will expect due to the free-rider 
problem associated with takeover bids.125  This way, the bidder will still be able to retain 
some of the gains from his monitoring upon acquisition of the firm. Even if a third party 
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ends up realizing the synergy gains, sale of the toehold will ensure that search costs are 
made up for. From this perspective, by reducing the potential gains from acquiring a 
toehold, mandating early disclosure reduces the incentives to incur search costs, to the 
detriment of the market for corporate control.126  
An alternative perspective is offered by the Takeover Directive, which justifies its 
mandatory bid rule – i.e., the forced sharing of the control premium with other shareholders 
– by citing the need for protection of minority shareholders and emphasizing that 
shareholders should be treated equally.127  However, as argued by Luca Enriques, such rule has 
dubious effects on minority shareholders’ welfare, precisely because of the chilling effect on 
takeover activity, and no justification in terms of equal treatment.128  Much of his line of 
reasoning applies equally to the limitation of a bidder’s profits from stakebuilding on 
grounds of fairness and equal treatment.129  
Adding to the complexity is the fact that disclosure functions as an early warning 
system to target management, enabling it to respond, for example, by mounting defensive 
measures.130  Mandatory disclosure thus potentially undermines the market for corporate 
control.131  Yet disclosure can also be useful, because control contestability comes not only 
with benefits but also with costs. These include the costs of inefficient takeovers and of 
insiders responding to takeover threat by behaving myopically.132  Thus, some protection 
from takeovers may promote insiders’ incentives to increase firm value. Moreover, 
temporary defenses could benefit existing shareholders by strengthening the board’s 
bargaining position. Once the playing field is leveled, the board can negotiate a higher offer 
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price in the case of a bid that undervalues the target. In addition, the board can 
encourage others to launch a superior bid. 
Outside the takeover context, early disclosure can make life difficult for activist 
shareholders, particularly in combination with tight rules on acting in concert.133  Some 
commentators suggest Germany’s recent decision to lower its initial reporting threshold to 
3% may have been driven by the controversial approach of Deutsche Börse by hedge funds 
in 2005.134  In some countries, issuers are provided with additional tools to trace suitors. For 
example, UK listed companies have a statutory right to demand clarification from any 
person whom they believe to be interested in the company’s shares.135  One expert group 
has recommended the European Commission consider adopting such a right at European 
level.136  Still, this tool may prove of little help if the target is unaware of the stakebuilding. 
For policymakers, the challenge is to weigh these competing interests to achieve a 
balance that inevitably is “delicate and perhaps even unstable.”137  A study by the FSA 
concludes that overall, by minimizing toeholds and providing information on impending 
takeovers, ownership disclosure should improve the contestability on the market for 
takeovers.138  This suggests that ownership disclosure can be a valuable mechanism to 
improve corporate governance. 
2. Ownership Disclosure as a Communication Tool 
Another mechanism through which ownership disclosure can improve corporate 
governance is by providing a communication tool. Ownership disclosure can enable 
communication between the company and its shareholders, and among shareholders. This 
can be particularly valuable in firms with dispersed share ownership. 
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Knowing fellow shareholders enables shareholders to exchange thoughts, to agree among 
themselves and to effectively assert their rights.139  The ability for institutional shareholders 
to communicate prior to shareholder meetings is key if they are to play an important role 
in the governance of portfolio companies, as envisaged by the European Commission.140  
But it may not always be easy to identify fellow shareholders.141  In many jurisdictions, 
shareholders will rely on ownership disclosure for this. 
Communication between the company and its shareholders is also vital. In order for 
companies to effectively manage their investor relations, they need to have insight into 
their shareholder base.142  This was one of the reasons for the Commission to extend the 
scope of the disclosure rules to holders of derivatives granting access to voting rights.143  
There are, of course, other means through which a company can trace the identity of 
its shareholders.144  For instance, in the case of registered shares or dematerialized bearer 
shares the company may be able to track its shareholders down the chain of intermediaries. 
But in practice this may prove burdensome, in particular in the case of cross-border 
investments or separation of registered ownership from economic ownership.145  By 
contrast, an ad hoc disclosure obligation as imposed by the Transparency Directive puts the 
burden on the beneficial shareholder and thereby ensures timely disclosure of his interests.  
In sum, while ownership disclosure in itself may be insufficient for a company to have a 
complete picture of its shareholder base, it can provide a meaningful contribution. This is 
evidenced by a survey among US firms, which shows that 25% of respondents learned of 
activist investors’ ownership though an SEC filing.146  
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C.  Extending the Framework to Insider Trading 
The previous sections have described the mechanisms through which ownership 
disclosure by major shareholders can improve market efficiency and corporate governance. 
This section extends the analytical framework to insider trading. It demonstrates that 
ownership disclosure by insiders essentially performs the same tasks, through the same 
mechanisms. 
First and foremost, disclosure of insider trading may improve market efficiency. To 
begin, the mere fact that managers own shares constitutes fundamental information. A 
survey among institutional investors shows that they consider inside ownership key in 
making investment decisions.147  Why? Presumably because the lower the level of insider 
ownership, the higher the agency costs could be, due to misalignment between the 
incentives of outside investors and management.148  On the other hand, significant inside 
ownership causes entrenchment, which could increase agency costs. There is some empirical 
research suggesting that firm value does indeed vary according to the level of inside 
ownership.149 Again, disclosure, by signaling the potential for increased or reduced agency 
costs, enables investors to assess the implications of inside ownership for the value of the 
share. 
Disclosure of trades by insiders may also contribute to market efficiency. This idea is 
reflected in the recitals of the Market Abuse Directive, which contains the European rules 
on insider trading and states that the publication of trades by insiders can be a “highly 
valuable source of information to investors.”150  First, disclosure of changes in the level of 
inside ownership allows investors to re-assess incentive and entrenchment effects. Second, 
disclosure may convey underlying fundamental information driving the trades. Even though 
the prohibition on trading on non-public information applies, managers can be expected to 
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possess such information and their trades therefore potentially convey new information on 
the firm’s prospects.151  This is evidenced by studies showing that insiders tend to purchase 
stock prior to an abnormal rise in stock prices and sell stock prior to an abnormal decline in 
stock prices.152   
It may come as no surprise, then, that markets tend to respond to disclosure of insider 
trading.153  Moreover, the evidence suggests that the direction and magnitude of the 
response depends on the information the transaction likely conveys regarding the firm’s 
prospects as well the expected incentive and entrenchment effects.154  
There is also a case for transparency of disproportionality between voting rights and 
cash flow rights. As with large shareholders, the extent to which managers’ interests are 
aligned with the interests of other shareholders is influenced by their financial interest in 
share price performance. Just as the incentives of large shareholders may be distorted if 
they have disproportionally little capital at stake, so may the incentives of managers who 
have hedged their equity interest.155  
Finally, disclosure of insider trading can improve corporate governance, by facilitating 
enforcement of the prohibition to trade on non-public information. This mechanism is 
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acknowledged in the recitals of the Market Abuse Directive156  and a related directive, 
which states that the information is not only valuable to market participants, but also 
constitutes a means for authorities to supervise markets.157  
II. HIDDEN OWNERSHIP 
The over-the-counter equity derivatives market has grown exponentially over the last 
decade, with an estimated notional amount of $10.2 trillion at the end of June 2008 - more 
than half of which was accounted for by derivatives of European shares.158  Equity 
derivatives are regularly used by hedge funds to leverage their exposure.159  Yet, there have 
been instances where hedge funds, as well as hostile bidders, have used derivatives to 
influence corporate control, without fully disclosing their interests.  
Although the terms of cash settled derivative contracts such as options and contracts 
for differences (Cfd) inherently do not stipulate a transfer of the reference shares, such 
contracts may, as a practical matter, involve shares.160  The reason is that the short party, 
usually an investment bank, will typically hedge its position by acquiring the reference 
shares. This raises two potential issues: 
First, the bank may be inclined to exercise the voting rights attached to the reference 
shares according to the preferences of its counterparty, for example a hedge fund. The bank 
will generally be indifferent to the voting rights, while the fund has an economic interest in 
the shares. The bank will thus have a commercial incentive to accommodate the fund’s 
wishes regarding the exercise of the voting rights. Yet under existing rules, the fund may be 
able to avoid disclosure of its ability to influence control, resulting in a lack of 
transparency. 
Second, cash settled derivative contracts, despite their terms, may be physically settled. 
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Once a contract has expired, the bank will have to unwind its position by disposing of the 
reference shares. If it concerns a substantial stake, the bank may not be able to sell the 
shares in the market without depressing the share price. By instead transferring the shares 
to the counterparty if so requested, the bank can simultaneously avoid lower proceeds and 
accommodate its client. Again, under existing rules, the fund may be able to avoid upfront 
disclosure of its ability to eventually acquire the shares, resulting in a lack of transparency. 
These two issues have materialized, for example, in the context of a high profile battle 
between activist hedge fund TCI and CSX, a major US railroad company. TCI had amassed a 
significant stake in CSX partly through total return swaps (TRS), the US equivalent of Cfd, 
which it had not immediately disclosed. CSX felt this had enabled TCI to ambush CSX in the 
run-up to a proxy contest, and sued TCI for violation of US securities laws. The case 
focused on whether TCI qualified as beneficial owner of the reference shares, in which case 
it would have been subject to a disclosure obligation.161  The key question was whether TCI 
had a “significant ability” to affect how voting power or investment power with respect to 
the reference shares would be exercised.162  
As to investment power, the court observed that TCI had significantly influenced its 
counterparties to purchase or sell CSX shares.163  This conclusion was based on the fact that 
(1) it was inevitable, due to the “very nature” of the TRS, that TCI’s counterparties would 
hedge the TRS by purchasing CSX shares, (2) this is what TCI contemplated, and (3) the 
counterparties did in fact hedge their positions.164  This also explains why TCI limited the 
size of its TRS with individual counterparties: to avoid triggering a disclosure obligation on 
their part.165  Moreover, the court observed that the fact that TCI had the ability to agree 
to unwind the swaps in kind meant that the hedge positions “hang like the sword of 
Damocles over the neck of CSX.”166  
As to voting power, the court found there was reason to believe that TCI was in a 
                                                
161 Rule 13d-3(a) of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. 240.13d-3(a) (a beneficial owner of a security includes 
any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or 
otherwise has or shares: (i) voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the voting of, such 
security; and/or, (ii) investment power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct the disposition of, 
such security). 
162 CSX Corporation v. The Children's Investment Fund Management (UK) L.L.P. et al. (1:08-Cv-02764-
Lak (Filed Mar. 17, 2008) (S.D.N.Y.), at 51. 
163 Id. at 61. 
164 Id. at 52, 60. 
165 Id. at 53. 
166 Id.  
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position to influence the exercise of voting rights by its counterparties, especially 
Deutsche Bank.167  This finding relied primarily on the fact that while TCI had initially 
entered into TRS with multiple banks, it had subsequently concentrated its TRS in Deutsche 
Bank. In doing so, TCI was motivated by the belief that it could influence how Deutsche 
Bank voted its CSX shares.168  Remarkably, Deutsche Bank next recalled the shares, which it 
had lent out, in order to be able to vote them at the shareholders meeting where the proxy 
battle would be decided. Whether it did so pursuant to an explicit or implicit agreement with 
TCI was, in the court’s view, a “close one.”169   
Ultimately, the court did not hold that TCI directly qualified as beneficial owner, but 
merely that TCI should be deemed beneficial owner, because it used the swaps to evade the 
disclosure obligation. Still, the decision went further than the decision by German regulator 
BaFin in a recent case concerning the takeover of automotive company Continental by 
Schaeffler. Before Schaeffler announced its unsolicited offer in the summer of 2008, it had 
built up a stake comprising just below 3% of shares, just below 5% of call options and 
approximately 28% of cash settled equity swaps.170  Yet, while it essentially held a 36% 
stake, the composition of the stake had enabled Schaeffler to refrain from making any 
prior disclosure. Consequently, both the market and Continental were caught by surprise. 
Despite public outcry, BaFin concluded there had been no violation, since it had been unable 
to find evidence of agreements that would have triggered disclosure obligations.171  
These are not unique cases. Henry Hu and Bernard Black, who have coined the term 
“hidden (morphable) ownership” to describe the combination of undisclosed economic 
ownership plus probable informal voting power, have identified a number of cases across the 
globe.172  These have changed the political economy and spurred lawmakers into action. 
The UK Takeover Code now requires economic interests to be disclosed during offer 
periods.173  The scope of the general UK disclosure regime is about to be expanded along the 
                                                
167 Id. at 61.  
168 Id. at 27, 56. A hedge fund within Deutsche Bank, Austin Friars Capital, also had a proprietary 
position in CSX, and Deutsche Bank was involved with TCI’s initial plans for CSX. 
169 Id. at 58. 
170 Dirk A. Zetzsche, Continental AG vs. Schaeffler, Hidden Ownership and European Law - Matter of 
Law or Enforcement?, EBOR (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7, 8, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1170987). 
171 Press Release, BaFin, No Breach of Reporting Requirements Identified in Continental AG Takeover 
Procedure (Aug. 21, 2008) (on file with author). For a critique, see Zetzsche, supra note 170, at 34. 
172 Hu & Black, supra note 155. 
173 UK Takeover Code, art. 8 (3). 
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same lines.174  Similar regulatory developments have occurred in Switzerland, Australia and 
Hong Kong.175  In other jurisdictions, such as France and Canada, regulators are 
contemplating amending the rules.176  Courts have also addressed the issue, for example in 
New Zealand and Italy.177  Nonetheless, the issue has only marginally received attention at 
European level thus far. 
A.  Existing Disclosure Requirements 
First, let us consider briefly the extent to which hidden ownership is captured by existing 
disclosure requirements. To ensure disclosure by the beneficial owner, the Transparency 
Directive extends disclosure obligations to parties deemed to have access to voting rights, 
so that “publicly traded companies are informed not only about security holders, but also 
about those who may effectively exercise lots of influence.”178  Consequently, disclosure 
obligations also apply when, for example, voting rights are held by controlled entities.179  
Various criteria are used to try to capture the beneficial owner, such as “power to exercise 
dominant influence or control,” “discretion,” “instruction” and “independently.”180  Here, 
                                                
174 FSA, DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE: FEEDBACK AND POLICY STATEMENT ON CP07/20, 
AND FURTHER TECHNICAL CONSULTATION, CP08/17, 3 (October 2008); FSA, DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS 
FOR DIFFERENCE: FEEDBACK ON CP08/17 AND FINAL RULES (March 2009). 
175 Ordinance of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission on Stock Exchanges and Securities Trading, art. 
13; AUSTRALIAN TAKEOVERS PANEL, GUIDANCE NOTE 20 EQUITY DERIVATIVES (2008); HONG KONG 
SECURITIES & FUTURES COMMISSION, OUTLINE OF PART XV OF THE SECURITIES AND FUTURES ORDINANCE 
(CAP. 571) - PISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS (2003). 
176 RAPPORT SUR LES DÉCLARATIONS DE FRANCHISSEMENT DE SEUIL DE PARTICIPATION ET LES 
DÉCLARATIONS D'INTENTION GROUPE DE TRAVAIL PRÉSIDÉ PAR BERNARD FIELD, MEMBRE DU COLLÈGE DE 
L'AMF, 12 (2008); CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATORS, PROPOSED NATIONAL INSTRUMENT 55-104 
INSIDER REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS, COMPANION POLICY 55-104CP INSIDER REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS AND RELATED CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS, 9 (2008). See also IRISH 
TAKEOVER PANEL, CONSULTATION PAPER DISCLOSURE OF DEALINGS AND INTERESTS IN DERIVATIVES AND 
OPTIONS – TROPOSALS TO AMEND THE TAKEOVER RULES (2008). 
177 New Zealand: Ithaca (Custodians) Ltd. v. Perry Corp., [2003] 2 N.Z.L.R. 216 (H.C.), rev'd, [2004] 1 
N.Z.L.R. 731 (C.A.); [2004] 2 N.Z.L.R. 182 (C.A.); Italy: Sentenza Della Corte D'appello Di Torino 
Sezione Prima Civile 5.12.2007/23.1.2008, available at http://www.consob.it (technically, this case was 
about wrongful disclosure made by the companies involved when they responded to questions by Consob 
with respect to their intentions concerning the control of FIAT); see also Lisa Curran & Francesca Turito, 
Fiat/ Ifil: The Securities Law Implications for Equity Derivatives, 21 JIBFL 298 (2006); GUIDO FERRARINI, 
PRESTITO TITOLI E DERIVATI AZIONARI NEL GOVERNO SOCIETARIO’, in LA SOCIETÀ PER AZIONI OGGI, 
COLLANA DELLA RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 629 (Balzarini, Carcano, Ventoruzzo eds., 2007). 
178 European Commission, supra note 44, at 25. Conversely, exemptions from notification requirements 
are available to parties who merely qualify as shareholder in name; see, e.g., Transparency Directive, supra 
note 10, art. 9 (4) and 5 (b). 
179 See Transparency Directive, supra note 10, art. 10 (e). Relatedly, the definition of “shareholder” 
provided by article 2 (1) (e) of the Directive encompasses persons who hold shares directly or “indirectly.” 
180 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, art. 10 (e) jo. 2 (1) (f) (iv) and art. 10 (f); art. 12 (4) jo. art. 10 
of Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Certain 
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the Directive lets substance prevail over form. 
Disclosure obligations are also extended to parties acting in concert or to parties on 
whose behalf shares are held by a third party.181  Moreover, they are extended to holders of 
certain equity derivatives, because the Commission acknowledges that “[i]nfluence may be 
directly exercised on companies through shares, but also indirectly through financial 
instruments conferring the right to acquire or sell shares [emphasis added].”182  This suggests 
a more formal approach. 
Indeed, in the case of Cfd that do not grant a right of acquisition of the underlying 
shares at settlement, there is no obligation to disclose pursuant to article 13 of the 
Directive.183  This article stipulates that call options and similar instruments count towards 
the trigger of a disclosure obligation. But it only covers instruments that grant the holder, 
on maturity, “either the unconditional right to acquire the underlying shares or the 
discretion as to his right to acquire such shares or not,” which right must derive from an 
agreement that is binding under applicable law.184  This formalistic approach does not take 
into account that, in practice, there can be a thin line between formal rights and de facto 
powers. 
Similar difficulties arise when applying the provisions regarding acting in concert to Cfd. 
Article 10 (a) of the Directive refers to the conclusion of an agreement that obliges the 
parties to adopt, by concerted exercise of the voting rights they hold, a lasting common 
policy towards the management of the issuer. Again, the emphasis is on the existence of an 
agreement, which renders it unlikely that a disclosure obligation arises if a bank votes while 
merely taking into account the preferences of its client.185  
Possibly, voting rights attached to underlying shares held by the short party could, under 
certain circumstances, be considered to be held “on behalf of” the long party within the 
meaning of article 10 (g) of the Directive.186  At least among German and Portuguese 
                                                                                                                                                
Provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC, 2007 O.J. L (69) 27. 
181 Transparency Directive, supra note 10, art. 10 (a) and (g). 
182 European Commission, supra note 44, at 18. 
183 See CESR, CESR’S FINAL TECHNICAL ADVICE ON POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTING MEASURES OF THE 
TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE, CESR /05-407, 63 (2005). But see CESR, supra note 191, at 2 (announcing that 
it will address the possibility of application of the notifications regime to derivative products). 
184 Commission Directive 2007/14/EC, supra note 180, art 11 (1). 
185 CESR, supra note 183, at 29. 
186 Relatedly, the definition of “shareholder” provided by article 2 (1) (e) (ii) of the Transparency Directive, 
supra note 10, encompasses persons who hold shares in their own name, but “on behalf of” another person. 
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lawyers, there apparently is consensus that a contractual scheme leads to the short party 
holding the underlying shares “on behalf of” the long party if the latter (1) bears the 
economic risk and (2) is capable of influencing how voting rights are exercised.187  On the 
basis of this interpretation, Dirk Zetzsche has developed a compelling argument that equity 
swaps such as those employed by Schaeffler should trigger a disclosure obligation under this 
article.188  
Whether this interpretation prevails across Europe, however, remains to be seen. In 
providing advice on the implementation of this article, the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) has offered the example of a trust, which suggests a somewhat 
narrower interpretation.189  The FSA, in conducting an extensive analysis of Cfd in relation 
to existing disclosure obligations, did not refer to the article or to its UK law equivalent.190  
Nor does the fact that market participants, commentators and even the European 
parliament have called upon the European Commission to increase transparency suggest 
that current rules provide adequate disclosure.191  The following section explains why this is 
a concern. 
                                                
187 See Zetzsche, supra note 170, at 20. 
188 Id. 
189 CESR, supra note 183, at 33. 
190 FSA, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE; INVESTMENT ENTITIES LISTING REVIEW, 
CP/064, 49 (2006). 
191 See, e.g., Synthesis of the Comments on the Third Consultation Document of the Internal Market and 
Services Directorate-General: “Fostering an Appropriate Regime for Shareholders’ Rights”, at 14 (Sept. 
2007) (respondents suggest that the Commission address the issues raised by derivatives); CESR, FEEDBACK 
STATEMENT, CESR/08-66, 2 (2008) (respondents suggest that CESR consider application of the notification 
regime to derivatives); European Parliament: Resolution of 23 September 2008 with Recommendations to the 
Commission on Transparency of Institutional Investors, (2007/2239(Ini)), ¶ O & art. 1 (2008) (stating that 
“some over-the-counter (OTC) products could use more open or visible trading systems in order to (…) to 
give an indication of potential ownership changes” and calling for more transparency of hedge funds); the 
preceding report HEDGE FUNDS: TRANSPARENCY AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT - 
DEPARTMENT FOR ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY, 28 (2007) (noting that a case can be made for all 
notifications of large shareholdings under the Transparency Directive to include (a) significant (3% or greater) 
short positions, and (b) also any derivative positions, whether long or short); letter from the European 
Association for Listed Companies (EALIC) to Commissioner McCreevy dated Sept. 14, 2007, at 3 
(describing lack of transparency caused by derivatives and asking whether CESR would support an extension 
of the scope of the major holdings disclosure provisions), available at http://www.europeanissuers.eu; Hu & 
Black, supra note 2, at 836; Moloney, supra note 3, at 195; Elizabeth Fournier, Europe Needs Coordinated 
Cfd Disclosure, IFLR, Oct. 2008; John C. Coffee, Regulators Need to Shed Light on Derivatives, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, June 29, 2008. 
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B.  Understanding Why Hidden Ownership is Problematic 
Part 1 has provided a taxonomy of the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure 
improves market efficiency and corporate governance. The following section uses this 
taxonomy as a framework for analysis of hidden ownership. The analysis shows that hidden 
ownership severely undermines these mechanisms. Thus, it becomes clear why hidden 
ownership is so problematic. 
To begin with, hidden ownership distorts the view of the voting structure. This point is 
eloquently made by the court in CSX, which describes how accumulating shares to hedge 
equity derivatives may alter the “corporate electorate”: (1) it may eliminate the shares 
from the “universe of available votes” because the banks have a policy of not voting hedge 
shares, (2) it may subject “the voting of the shares to the control or influence of a long 
party that does not own the shares,” or (3) it may result in the shares being voted by an 
institution “that has no economic interest in the fortunes of the issuer” but “is aware that 
future swap business from a particular client may depend upon voting in the ‘right’ way.”192  
Hidden ownership also distorts the view of changes in the voting structure. Consider the 
use of cash settled equity derivatives to facilitate a creeping takeover. Although a change in 
control is imminent, the stakebuilding is not disclosed and investors are unable to assess the 
implications for the value of the share.193  
Moreover, hidden ownership affects transparency of capital movements. First, the long 
party’s interest remains undisclosed. Yet, its economic ownership exceeds its formal voting 
rights, which means there is no increased incentive to extract private benefits. On the 
contrary, the long party will often have an increased incentive to encourage maximization 
of cash flow through dividends. To the extent the long party can influence corporate 
decisionmaking, it may therefore be risk-averse to a different degree than ordinary 
shareholders. Admittedly, lack of transparency of this fact appears to be of relatively 
slighter concern. 
Second, the heightened interest in the share remains undisclosed. If the bank acting as 
                                                
192 CSX Corp., supra note 162, at 11. 
193 The European Commission acknowledges this possibility, noting that in practice, cash settled options 
may facilitate the localization of blocks of shares at a later point in time, even though a legal entitlement to 
purchase such shares does not exist; European Commission, supra note 133, at 11. 
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counterparty discloses its purchase of reference shares, the market may attach less 
significance to this than it would if the purchase was made by a hedge fund known for 
identifying undervalued targets. If the fund enters into derivative contracts with multiple 
banks and limits the size of individual contracts to avoid disclosure on their part, the 
market does not even learn of the increased interest in the share at all, other than through 
a possible shift in supply and demand. As a result, the fundamental information that may 
drive the fund’s transactions is impounded in the share price at a slower rate than if its 
transactions were fully disclosed.194  
Third, hidden ownership may distort the market’s perception of the size of the free 
float. If equity derivatives are entered into with a number of banks and the volume of each 
transaction is kept below the initial threshold for disclosure, the free float may be 
significantly reduced because the reference shares, acquired by the banks for hedging 
purposes, are effectively taken out of the market. Yet, in contrast to the situation where 
one party amasses a stake and makes appropriate disclosure, the market remains unaware of 
this.  
Consider the case of carmaker Porsche, which late 2008 disclosed that it had increased 
its economic stake in Volkswagen from 35% to 74.1% through cash settled options.195  As a 
result, the free float had effectively been reduced to a mere 5.8%, assuming Porsche’s 
counterparties had hedged their positions by acquiring the reference shares. Until Porsche 
made its disclosure, this reduction in free float had remained invisible because Porsche had 
not been required to disclose its stakebuilding, and liquidity was offered by hedge funds who 
were massively betting on a decline in Volkswagen’s share price by borrowing shares and 
selling them short. As reported by the Financial Times, Volkswagen’s shares more than 
doubled after Porsche’s disclosure, as hedge funds, “rushing to cover short positions, were 
forced to buy stock from a shrinking pool of shares in free float.”196  A leading corporate 
governance expert observed that the incident “should get the politicians and supervisory 
                                                
194 Indeed, one of the reasons cited by the UK Takeover Panel to expand the scope of its disclosure rules to 
economic interests was that this would enable shareholders to understand why share prices may be moving in 
a particular direction. THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, DEALINGS IN DERIVATIVES AND OPTIONS, 
CONSULTATION PAPER PCP 2005/1, 11 (2005). But see FSA, supra note 174, at 9 (responding to calls for 
greater transparency of Cfd irrespective of their control implications by stating that it does not have compelling 
evidence of market failure in respect of inefficient price formation caused by a lack of transparency). 
195 Milne, supra note 1. 
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authorities to think again about allowing this untransparent situation.”197  
Hidden ownership also undermines the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure 
improves corporate governance. Transparency of economic interests facilitates 
enforcement of the prohibition of trading on non-public information, or, more generally, 
the prohibition of market abuse. Regulators worldwide have applied this line of reasoning 
recently when they mandated disclosure of short positions.198  Interestingly, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has acknowledged that “the 
reporting of short positions might not provide a full picture if the data excludes 
derivatives.”199  
The primary concern in the area of enforcement, however, is that the undisclosed use 
of equity derivatives can affect the market for corporate control, by putting the acquirer at 
an advantage over other players in the game. As we have seen, if the objective is to 
facilitate the market for corporate control, setting the trigger for disclosure at the 
appropriate level is key. On the one hand, a bidder's ability to use equity derivatives to 
acquire a toehold can facilitate takeover bids.200  But if the target company’s ability to 
bargain for a higher offer price is limited, or if potential interlopers are discouraged from 
launching a competing offer, overall the market for corporate control may be adversely 
affected. 
The market for corporate control does not operate solely through public offers. 
Control can also shift through contested director elections, as in CSX. A shift in control 
can even be initiated by a minor shareholder who puts a controversial item on the agenda. 
This is exemplified by the case of Dutch bank ABN AMRO. Early 2007, TCI (indeed, the 
                                                
197 Id. To be sure, the risk of a squeeze is inherent to short selling. The size of the free float can merely 
give the market some indication of potential supply. To give the market an indication of potential demand, it 
would need information on the aggregate short position in a single stock. See FSA, supra note 77, annex 3, at 
7. See also IOSCO, supra note 75, at 15 (noting that “[i]nformation that sales are short creates an awareness 
that, at some future point, many of those sales will need to be reversed by new purchases”, but also that 
disclosure of short positions “would leave some short sellers vulnerable to tactical behavior that may trap 
them in bear squeezes”). 
198 See, e.g., SEC Release No. 34-58785, at 8; FSA, supra note 80, at 10. See also IOSCO, supra note 
76, at 13 (enumerating a number of enforcement related issues that regulators should take into account in 
establishing a reporting regime); Working Document of the Commission Services (DG Internal Market): 
Consultation Paper on Hedge Funds, at 6 (2008) (noting that “enhanced transparency of short selling 
practices should be envisaged as a minimum” to detect abusive trading strategies). But see FSA, supra note 
79, at 112 (noting that the FSA’s legal powers to require disclosure of short selling positions may need to 
rest on a responsibility to maintain orderly markets and financial stability instead of being based on the market 
abuse regime). 
199 IOSCO, supra note 76, at 14. 
200 Hu & Black, supra note 2, at 825. 
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same hedge fund as in CSX) initiated a shareholder vote on the break-up of the company. 
The resolution was partially adopted and, while it was not legally binding on the board, it 
would set in motion a string of events eventually leading to the break-up of ABN AMRO as 
a result of a public offer by a consortium of three European banks. 
By using equity derivatives, shareholders who merely hold sufficient shares to put an 
item on the agenda of the shareholders’ meeting may in fact hold a much larger economic 
interest. They may also hold a smaller economic interest, which implies a risk of empty 
voting, discussed in the following section. In both cases, it is impossible to determine the 
relevant shareholder’s true interest and hence its incentives and potential influence. This 
raises real concerns for issuers, as evidenced by the fact that by late 2008, no less than 369 
US issuers had amended their bylaws to require full disclosure of derivative positions by 
shareholders submitting a proposal or nominating directors for election at shareholder 
meetings.201  
Finally, a concern might be that equity derivatives make it more difficult for issuers to 
know who has a stake in them. Recall that this issue was on the Commission’s mind when it 
extended the scope of the disclosure obligation to derivatives granting the right of access to 
voting rights. Can the same argument be invoked to mandate disclosure of equity 
derivatives that may offer informal access to voting rights, such as Cfd? Issuers certainly 
seem to believe so.202  The FSA has dismissed this concern on the ground that it sees no 
evidence of a market failure here.203  But with barriers to cross-border investment fading 
away and issuers seeing their shareholder base becoming increasingly widespread, the 
importance of managing investor relations is only growing. Against this background, there 
may well be reason for concern. 
                                                
201 Alexia Robinson, Addressing the Issue of Derivative Disclosure in Advance Notice Requirements, 
Sharkrepellent.net, Dec. 16, 2008. Available at https://www.sharkrepellent.net/pub/rs_20081216.html.  
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III. EMPTY VOTING 
Hu and Black have characterized as “empty voters” persons whose voting rights 
substantially exceed their net economic ownership.204  They describe how equity derivatives 
enable shareholders to hedge their economic interest and even create negative net 
economic ownership. Providing an example that by now is well known, they describe how a 
hedge fund, Perry Corp, held a large stake in a pharmaceutical company, King, that became 
the subject of a takeover bid. The fund stood to profit from a takeover premium, except 
that it was uncertain whether the deal would gain approval by the shareholders of the bidder, 
Mylan Labatories. To secure its profits, Perry took matters into its own hands and acquired 
a substantial stake in Mylan. This would enable it to vote for approval of the deal. Perry, 
however, hedged its stake in Mylan, leaving it with no economic exposure but full voting 
rights. Thus, it could be expected that in exercising its voting rights, Perry would be guided 
by its interests in the target rather than its interests as a shareholder in Mylan, potentially 
to the detriment of Mylan and its (other) shareholders. 
Hu and Black further describe cases of “record date capture,” instances where parties 
borrow shares prior to the voting record date in order to vote the shares and return them 
afterwards. More generally, they describe cases, in the US as well as in Europe, in which 
shareholders have been able to exercise voting rights without a corresponding economic 
interest, apparently manipulating the outcome of votes in order to realize personal gains. 
Thus, empty voting potentially poses a serious threat to the quality of the decisionmaking 
process in shareholders’ meetings of listed companies, which explains why the issue has 
drawn attention from market participants,205  regulators (including the SEC)206  and 
                                                
204 Hu & Black, supra note 2, at 825. 
205 European Commission, supra note 191, at 3, 14 (showing that there is general support among 
respondents for measures enhancing transparency of stock lending and that a majority of respondents believes 
that the issue needs to be addressed at EU level); CESR, supra note 191, at 2 (respondents advocate 
application of the notifications regime to stock lending and derivatives); European Corporate Governance 
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and the letter of Dec. 12, 2008 by EuropeanIssuers (advocating complete transparency of stock lending towards 
all concerned parties, including the issuer). Available at http://www.europeanissuers.eu. 
206 See, e.g., a speech by SEC staff (John White), Don't Throw Out Baby With Bathwater, Keynote 
address at ABA section of business law fall meeting (Nov. 21, 2008). In Delaware, where many US Fortune 
500 companies are incorporated, the Delaware General Corporation Law may soon be amended to partially 
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academics.207  In spite of this, the issue has, again, only received marginal attention at 
European level.208  
To be sure, just as it can be legitimately questioned whether mandating one share-one 
vote would be socially beneficial, it can be questioned whether an absolute ban on empty 
voting would be. A study by Christoffersen et al., for example, suggests that vote trading 
may serve the socially beneficial role of incorporating more information in corporate 
votes.209  Similarly, a recent theoretical study by Brav and Mathews takes into account the 
possibility that the vote buyer and vote seller may not have coinciding interests. Their 
model suggests that strategic traders adjusting their economic ownership can improve 
overall efficiency, despite the fact that they will sometimes sell short after the record date 
and then vote to decrease firm value.210   
Equally true, though, is that the question of whether there should be transparency merits 
separate consideration. Before answering this question, let us consider briefly the extent to 
which the potential of empty voting becomes transparent under existing disclosure 
requirements. 
A.  Existing Disclosure Requirements 
European Commissioner McCreevy, announcing he would not pursue one share-one 
vote nor expand disclosure requirements, has stated that the Transparency Directive 
                                                                                                                                                
respond to empty voting. See Michael B. Tumas & John F. Grossbauer, Proposed Amendments to the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (Client Memorandum of Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP dated Feb. 
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record date that is as many as 60 days prior to the meeting date). European rules already provide that the 
record date shall not lie more than 30 days before the date of the general meeting and that at least eight days 
should elapse between the date for the convocation of the general meeting and the record date. Shareholders’ 
Rights Directive, supra note 106, art. 8 (3). 
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209 Susan E. K. Christoffersen, Christopher C. Geczy, David K. Musto & Adam V. Reed, Vote Trading 
and Information Aggregation, 62 J. Fin. 2897, 2927 (2007). 
210 Alon Brav & Richmond D. Mathews, Empty Voting and Efficiency (April 2008). AFA 2009 San 
Francisco Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108632. For a broader discussion of 
the potential for empty voting to produce inefficient outcomes, see Hu & Black, supra note 81, at 668-627. 
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already contains ample provisions on transparency.211  Remarkably, this statement 
appears to have been based, at least in part, on two studies acknowledging that the Directive 
offers limited insight and that investors believe increased transparency may be necessary.212  
The studies also point at the lack of transparency with regard to the decoupling of voting 
rights from economic ownership through securities lending and derivatives.213  
Indeed, the Directive offers hardly any transparency with respect to cash flow rights, 
and even less with respect to empty voting. Acquiring a substantial capital interest per se 
does not trigger a disclosure obligation, contrary to the US.214  The Directive also falls short 
of requiring disclosure of the number of shares held on the notification form, let alone 
arrangements affecting economic exposure.215  The fact that cash flow rights did not need 
to be reported under the precursor of the Directive was identified more than a decade ago as 
a major reason why it was difficult to measure the separation between ownership and 
control in European firms.216  Unfortunately, the Directive has not changed this. Again, US 
rules go much further, especially for shareholders whose stake exceeds 10%, who are not 
only required to disclose the number of shares and options held but also other arrangements 
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affecting their economic exposure.217  
Despite the limited scope of the Directive’s disclosure rules, the rules at the level of 
individual European countries may be tighter, given that the Directive allows this.218  While 
individual countries have indeed imposed stricter disclosure requirements in many respects, 
they have not done so in respect of economic interests.219  Only in a few European 
countries can a disclosure obligation be triggered both as a result of acquiring voting rights 
and as a result of acquiring shares.220  Moreover, only in about half of European countries 
are notifying shareholders required to report the percentage of share capital held in addition 
to the percentage of voting rights held, while there is no mention of reporting pure 
economic interests.221  
European countries have also taken divergent approaches with respect to securities 
lending. For example, in some European countries securities lending triggers a disclosure 
obligation on the part of both the borrower and the lender, while in others only on the part 
of the borrower.222  Taken together, this means that in some European countries the market 
might be unaware of both the fact that the borrower has no economic interest and that the 
lender no longer has the voting rights initially reported. 
A related question is whether the Market Abuse Directive requires disclosure of capital 
interests and hedging by insiders. Basically, the answer is yes. Under this directive, a 
disclosure obligation is triggered in the case of transactions in the share or “derivatives or 
other financial instruments linked to them.”223  Moreover, the notification should include a 
description of such financial instruments.224  These rules thus have a broader scope than the 
rules under the Transparency Directive – pretty much like US rules on insider trading do.225  
As such, they could provide inspiration for possible expansion of the Directive’s disclosure 
obligations, the need for which becomes clear in the following section. 
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B.  Understanding Why Empty Voting is Problematic 
Using the taxonomy of the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure improves 
market efficiency and corporate governance as a framework for analysis, it becomes clear 
that empty voting too severely undermines these mechanisms.226  Empty voting can affect 
transparency of economic interests essentially in the same way as lack of transparency of 
conventional deviations from one share-one vote.227  Indeed, the problem remains the 
same: the incentives of the shareholder whose voting rights exceed its economic exposure 
are distorted. In each case, transparency allows investors to assess the implications for the 
value of the share. 
With respect to empty voting, however, the market relies even more heavily on 
ownership disclosure for information. Information on most conventional disproportionate 
mechanisms is provided by an array of sources, including company statutes and initial and 
ongoing issuer disclosure requirements.228  This explains why the evidence suggests that the 
extent of private benefit extraction by controlling shareholders in dual-class firms is 
correctly anticipated; stock returns of such firms are not lower than those of single-class 
firms.229  These sources, however, will typically fail to inform the market if a wedge 
between voting rights and cash flow rights is created through market instruments instead of 
institutional instruments, not for the long term but for a short term, and not by insiders but 
by outside investors whose voting behavior may nonetheless determine the outcome of the 
voting process. What is needed in those cases is ad hoc disclosure by shareholders rather 
than initial or periodic disclosure by issuers. Hence the pivotal role of the Transparency 
Directive. 
Perhaps even more importantly, disclosure of the potential of empty voting can 
facilitate enforcement. Transparency enables issuers, shareholders and regulators to respond 
to, or prevent, abusive instances of empty voting. If, for example, it becomes clear that a 
hedge fund with substantial voting rights but a negative net economic position is trying to 
block a shareholder resolution, this could spur the company or other shareholders into 
                                                
226 Thus, the following analysis only offers insight into the adverse effects caused by empty voting through 
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action, through litigation or otherwise. Moreover, the prospect of public scrutiny may 
discourage shareholders from engaging in empty voting in the first place.230  The European 
Commission has already applied this line of reasoning with respect to sovereign wealth 
funds, which raise concerns that, in some respects, are similar to concerns over empty 
voters.231  
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
From the preceding analysis it becomes clear that, as a general matter, policymakers 
contemplating how to respond to hidden ownership and empty voting should not focus only 
on the most obvious problems caused by these phenomena, such as malfunctioning of the 
market for corporate control. Instead, they should take into account the whole range of 
adverse effects on market efficiency and corporate governance, as described in this paper. 
This observation should be particularly relevant to the European Commission, which is 
currently evaluating the European ownership disclosure regime, embodied in the 
Transparency Directive. The European Securities Markets Expert Group has suggested that 
informing market participants of significant changes in the voting structure is the 
Directive’s “exclusive” reason for being.232  But this paper has shown that ownership 
disclosure can improve market efficiency and corporate governance through various 
mechanisms. This means that the Commission should assess the extent to which each of 
these mechanisms are functioning adequately, taking into account their relative significance 
and interaction.233   
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Moreover, the analysis suggests that the Transparency Directive in its present 
form does not effectively prevent hidden ownership, and that hidden ownership severely 
undermines the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure improves market 
efficiency and corporate governance. This strongly suggests that the Commission should 
consider expanding the scope of the disclosure rules.234  Yet, while most of this paper has 
been devoted to discussing the benefits of disclosure, policymakers should duly take into 
account the potential costs of increased disclosure – beyond incremental compliance costs.  
By increasing market impact cost, for example, disclosure could reduce hedge funds’ 
incentives to incur the costs of searching for fundamental information and of engaging in 
activism.235  Given that preliminary findings suggest hedge fund activism benefits existing 
shareholders,236  regulators should caution not to unduly limit hedge funds’ ability to engage 
in activism.237  Fear that disclosure will prompt replication of trading strategies may also 
adversely affect liquidity. AIMA, which represents the hedge fund industry, has explicitly 
voiced this concern.238  
Still another cost could result from management of listed companies responding to 
information on stakebuilding through equity derivatives in a way that serves its own interest 
rather than the interest of the company and its shareholders. In the US, some issuers have 
already changed their shareholder rights plans to explicitly include derivatives when 
calculating the level of beneficial ownership that triggers the poison pill.239  Skeptics of the 
pill may be concerned about the adverse affects this could have on the market for corporate 
                                                                                                                                                
guarantee that those who had ultimate control could be properly identified; Becht, supra note 8, at 90. In 
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239 Mara Lemos-Stein, Poison Pills Target Derivatives, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2008. 
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control.240  Issuers could also respond by filing lawsuits alleging inaccurate disclosures, the 
accuracy of which becomes increasingly contestable as disclosure obligations become more 
complex. Such litigation risk could not only deter potential bidders, but also chill 
shareholder activism.241  
Indeed, the fact that issuers are among the loudest proponents of increased transparency 
should caution policymakers to carefully examine their motivations.242  This is of particular 
concern given that the current financial crisis may have affected the political economy so 
as to make policymakers even more responsive to issuers’ concerns over hedge fund 
activity.243  A case in point is the restriction of short selling, the efficacy of which remains 
controversial.244  
Similarly, the analysis has shown that the Transparency Directive sheds virtually no 
light on empty voting, and that empty voting severely undermines the mechanisms through 
which ownership disclosure improves market efficiency and corporate governance. Again, 
this strongly suggests the European Commission should consider expanding the scope of the 
disclosure rules, while being mindful of the potential costs and unintended consequences.  
One such unintended consequence could be an overflow of information. With respect to 
securities lending, the European Securities Markets Expert Group has expressed concern 
that too much disclosure could be misleading by making material information less easy to 
identify.245  Moreover, if and to the extent empty voting enhances efficiency, as some 
research suggests, disclosure could improve efficiency but also reduce efficiency, depending 
on the circumstances.246  This reminds us that any measure designed to address empty voting 
requires a thorough understanding of this phenomenon. Ironically, transparency may be 
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exactly what we need to obtain such understanding.247  
* * * 
In assessing the costs and benefits of increased disclosure, policymakers should also be 
mindful of the limitations of the law. As two prominent scholars have put it, 
“the drafters of the disclosure rules are usually lagging behind market developments 
in ways of acquiring interests in shares without triggering the disclosure requirement, 
which developments go some way to mitigate the adverse implications of the rules 
for acquirers.”248  
Indeed, the chief lobbyist of the German hedge fund industry was recently quoted as saying 
that he saw no need for a regulatory clampdown of equity derivatives in response to cases 
like Schaeffler because “[n]ew types of derivatives or trading techniques would emerge that 
were not subject to this regulation.”249   
These observations fit within a broader theory that law is inherently incomplete due to 
the fact that lawmakers are unable to foresee all future contingencies.250  The originators of 
this theory highlight the role for regulators as proactive law enforcers with an ability to 
adapt rules flexibly over time, an issue that will be revisited below. The inherent 
incompleteness of law also argues for a principle based approach rather than a legalistic 
approach. With this in mind, the FSA has extended the scope of its new disclosure rules to 
any financial instruments that have “a similar economic effect” as financial instruments 
that would trigger disclosure.251  
Finally, policymakers should assess whether existing rules are adequately enforced. As 
with any ad hoc disclosure obligation, because recipients do not expect particular disclosures 
in advance, vigorous enforcement is key to ensure compliance.252  Focus on enforcement by 
the European Commission is especially warranted in view of the recent accession of a host 
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of Eastern European countries to the European Union. Although most of these countries 
had adopted a 5% disclosure threshold by 2002, an empirical study found that in most of 
these countries the identity of the ultimate owner was still undisclosed due to the laxity in 
regulation or enforcement of disclosure.253  A related study found substantial variations 
across Eastern European countries in what companies disclose about their corporate 
governance arrangements, and concluded that while accession to the European Union has 
been successful in transforming the laws on the books, implementation at firm level is still 
lagging.254  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the fundamental question of why we have ownership disclosure 
rules. Using the European ownership disclosure regime as an example, the paper has first 
identified two main objectives of ownership disclosure rules: improving market efficiency 
and corporate governance. Next, it has analyzed how ownership disclosure performs these 
tasks. 
The analysis has shown that ownership disclosure can improve market efficiency 
through various mechanisms. By creating transparency of the voting structure and of 
changes in the voting structure, ownership disclosure enables investors to anticipate agency 
costs and to assess the implications for the value of a firm’s share. This way, ownership 
disclosure informs share prices. Other ways through which ownership disclosure informs 
share prices is by creating transparency of economic interests of shareholders, of trading 
interest and of the size of the free float. 
The analysis has also shown that ownership disclosure can improve corporate 
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governance through various mechanisms. First, ownership disclosure enables 
enforcement. In firms with concentrated ownership, it does so by facilitating monitoring of 
the controlling shareholder, thus preventing extraction of private benefits. In firms with 
dispersed ownership, it does so by facilitating the market for corporate control, the 
mechanism through which management is disciplined by takeovers and the threat thereof. 
Second, ownership disclosure facilitates communication among shareholders and between 
companies and their shareholders. 
The paper has further shown that the use of equity derivatives to exert undisclosed 
influence on issuers or to facilitate creeping acquisitions (“hidden ownership”) severely 
undermines the mechanisms through which ownership disclosure improves market 
efficiency and corporate governance. The same is true for the use of equity derivatives, 
securities lending or short selling to hedge economic exposure while retaining full voting 
rights (“empty voting”).  
Although more than ten years have passed since the seminal study of ownership 
disclosure in Europe, the key question raised in that study remains the same: is the 
definition of control sufficiently narrow to pin down the ultimate controlling agent?255  
This paper has argued that financial innovation causes the answer to be negative, which 
suggests that expansion of the rules is warranted. 
Three issues are not addressed in this paper, but merit careful consideration. First, while 
the paper has identified benefits as well as costs of disclosure, it does not offer an 
exhaustive cost-benefit analysis.256  Indeed, by complicating the taxonomy the paper may 
have presented policymakers with more questions than answers. But at least this should 
enable an evaluation of the disclosure regime that takes into account all relevant aspects. 
Second, the paper has largely assumed that the voting structure determines who controls 
the company. But this is a simplification of reality. Shareholders and other stakeholders can 
exert influence over issuers in a variety of ways, which explains why accounting and 
antitrust provisions typically use broader, more substantive concepts of control. This 
nuance has gained significant weight as governments have responded to the recent financial 
crisis by injecting huge amounts of capital in troubled financial institutions. 
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Late 2008, for example, the Dutch State injected EUR 10 billion in ING, one of 
Europe’s largest financial institutions.257  It did so through the purchase of non-voting core 
Tier-1 securities. As part of the deal, the State obtained the right to nominate two members 
for ING’s supervisory board with special approval rights. In some respects, the State can 
now exert more influence over ING than any shareholder can. Yet it does not hold a single 
share, and its influence remains invisible if we focus only on voting rights. This shows the 
limitations of using voting power as a proxy for control and represents an interesting 
avenue for further research. 
Third and finally, while the paper suggests that legislative action could be conducive to 
realizing the objectives of the European ownership disclosure regime – improving market 
efficiency and corporate governance -, it does not address the question of whether action 
should be taken at European level or whether this should be left to individual European 
countries. The fact that the regime provides for so-called minimum harmonization raises 
the question of whether it would be socially more beneficial to rely on regulatory 
competition between countries. The swiftness with which the UK has expanded its 
disclosure rules suggests this might be a fruitful approach. Indeed, its rapid response may be 
seen as an example of what Simon Deakin refers to as “efficient evolutionary adaptation of 
systems to changing environmental conditions,” facilitated by a directive that provides the 
conditions for local diversity and thus enables search and learning processes.258  
While it goes beyond the scope of this paper to address this question, two preliminary 
remarks can be made, taking into account the ambition of creating a single European 
market that inspired the European Commission to establish the disclosure regime. First, 
minimum harmonization presupposes that mere implementation at national level of the 
European rules creates sufficient transparency. Yet this paper has shown the floor is 
currently set too low, which may deter cross-border investment.259  Second, the current level 
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of divergence may deter cross-border investment by institutional investors, who are 
faced with no less than 27 different ownership disclosure regimes they potentially have to 
comply with.260  This raises concerns the Commission should duly take into account when 
determining its future policy on ownership disclosure. 
 
* * * 
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